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Abstract

Relative to its importance, little research has been done on the Romano-Parthian
rivalry that existed during the first two centuries AD. By extension, even less has been
written concerning the kingdom of classical Armenia, which often served as the focal
point of that bitter conflict. The absence of such research is regrettable, for it was this
very rivalry that dictated how the Empire’s eastern border would be defined. According
to many modern scholars and several of the classical authors, Romans feared the
looming threat of the Parthian state. Although such panic was unfounded, this fear
supposedly then prompted the Empire’s prolonged obsession with the territory of
Armenia, which both the scholarly and primary sources look upon as a military buffer
state. Yet in reality, Roman action in the East was not the result of a collective decision
of all Roman citizens, but rather brought about by the individual wants and desires of
Rome’s leaders. These leaders regarded Armenia not as a buffer state, but as a
staging ground for their various campaigns against Parthia. It was their personal
ambitions, rather than Rome’s collective fear, that drew Armenia under the veil of
Roman hegemony. This project intends to examine Armenia’s role in the RomanoParthian conflict and hopes to prove that Roman imperialism was not defensive, as
some scholars assert, but rather the end product of the ambitions of individual Roman
leaders.

iii

Introduction

The Roman Republic’s acquisition of the kingdom of Pergamum in 133 BC
marked the beginning of a long era of military occupation and political interference in
Asia Minor.1 The Third Mithridatic War (c. 74/73-71) in particular led Roman forces
beyond Anatolia to the very borders of Armenia. There, the campaigns of L. Licinius
Lucullus and Gn. Pompeius Magnus brought Rome into direct conflict with the Armenian
monarch Tigranes II. Over the course of the next three centuries, several major
campaigns and countless smaller expeditions would be conducted in the territory of the
Upper Euphrates. Diplomacy and court intrigues would result in the seemingly endless
rise and fall of Armenian kings, some clients of and others hostile to Rome. At the
death of Tigranes in 55 BC, however, Armenia became at best a second rate power in
the Near East. Why then, considering the resources expended during such endeavors,
did the Romans seek so desperately to maintain either military or political control of this
rather unproductive and often inhospitable territory?
One theory points to the threat that the Parthian Empire began to pose during the
latter half of the first century BC. This explanation proposes that the Romans regarded
Armenia as a defensive ‘buffer’ state, shielding the more vital imperial provinces of Asia
Minor and the Near East.2 This fact is not in dispute, for the Romans themselves, as
the literature will show, did indeed believe this territory to be such a bulwark. The
1

Strabo 13.4.2.
For references to Armenia as a ‘buffer’ state see Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the
Roman Empire (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 24; and Adrian N.
Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East: 168 BC-AD 1 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1983),
337; For references to Rome’s defensive policies see Theodor Mommsen, The History of Rome Vol. II,
Trans. by William Dickson (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903), 520-22 et passim; and Tenney
Frank, Roman Imperialism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1925), 8-9 et passim.
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biographer Suetonius criticized the Emperor Tiberius for allowing “the Parthians to
overrun Armenia – a negligence as dangerous to the Empire as it was dishonorable.”3
It should be, though, no surprise that the perceptions of the Roman authors and reality
did not necessarily coincide. Such a theory depicts Rome as being on the defensive,
resisting the constant assaults of an aggressive Parthia. Regardless of what the
ancient writers assert, however, this was simply not the case.
Roman generals, who led armies into Armenia following the campaigns of
Lucullus and Pompey, were, in fact, doing so in order to obtain glory and plunder, not
from that territory, but from its fierce and wealthy neighbor Parthia. The Third
Mithridatic War did, indeed, have repercussions far beyond anything that the Romans
had originally intended. It introduced them to the opportunities and wonders available
from the Middle and Far East. The Parthian Empire, which bestrode several famous
trade routes to India and China, flourished during the centuries in question by becoming
the middleman of the classical world. Thus, it is understandable why it also became the
object of so many Romans’ ambitions.4
Armenia was, in fact, therefore a defensive ‘buffer’ zone, though not for the
Romans. For when we examine in detail the military and political history of this territory,
as this paper intends to do, it is not the Roman Empire that appears on the defensive.
Regardless of what the sources, which are predominately Roman, suggest, few
Parthian armies ever mobilized that seriously endangered the imperial provinces. It was
rather Rome’s perpetual interference in Armenian and sometimes Parthian politics that
continually threatened the stability of the region. The territory of Armenia must,
3

Sue. Tib. 41.
M. P. Charlesworth, Trade-Routes and Commerce of the Roman Empire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1924), 58.
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therefore, be viewed less as a ‘buffer’ state and more as a staging ground. The Roman
Empire must be regarded, not as a noble defender of its provinces and allies, but as a
relentless aggressor, bent on expansion.
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to reshape modern views of ancient
Armenia. It will examine in detail the eastern campaigns and policies of Rome’s
generals and emperors. Although its scope will span nearly three centuries, 70 BC –
AD 220, it intends to show an overall pattern of Roman belligerence and militancy. Still,
this pattern should not be mistaken for an overarching strategy. Despite some
historians’ attempts to prove otherwise, Roman expansion in the East proceeded on a
case by case basis. The fires of Roman aggression were thus stoked not according to
some grand master plan, but according to the personal wants and desires of prominent
Roman figures like Pompey, Caesar Augustus, and Trajan. Their private lusts for glory
and plunder sustained Rome’s preoccupation with Armenia, not for its own sake, but for
the sake of what lay beyond. Parthia was, for many Romans, the greatest prize – and
Armenia, but a steppingstone.

3

Chapter 1
Origins of the Romano-Parthian Conflict

By 70 BC, the Third Mithridatic War between the Roman Republic and the
Kingdom of Pontus was winding to an indefinite conclusion. Despite having routed the
army of the Pontic king Mithridates IV Eupator, the Roman general L. Licinius Lucullus
had been unable to capture the king himself, who had fled eastward seeking protection
at the court of his son-in-law Tigranes II the Great of Armenia. Lucullus was prevented
from an immediate pursuit by prolonged sieges at Sinope and Amisus and tribal
uprisings of the Chaldaei and Tibareni. Although Pontus was now firmly under Roman
control, the escape of Mithridates must have made any such victory seem hollow and
unfulfilling.5
The Pontic king had, for nearly thirty years, been the undoing of Rome’s policies
concerning its Asian provinces. Besides being a constant threat to the Roman client
kingdoms of Bithynia and Cappadocia, his diplomatic maneuverings and military
incursions had already drawn Rome into two previous wars. If Lucullus was to accept a
triumph for his successes in Asia, such a display had to include the vanquished, broken
figure of Mithridates himself. Only then would Rome know that the power of Pontus had
been checked once and for all.6
To secure the king’s person, Lucullus sent his legate Appius Claudius to
Armenia. Tigranes the Great was, however, unable or perhaps unwilling to hold a
timely audience with the Roman emissary. Only after a lengthy journey throughout the
territory was Appius finally received by Tigranes at Antioch, at which meeting the rather
5
6

Plut. Luc. 19, 23; App. Mithr. 83; and Sherwin-White Roman Policy 171-73.
Sherwin-White Roman Policy 171-73.
4

cavalier demands of the Romans were presented. Appius ordered Tigranes either to
produce his father-in-law Mithridates or to expect a declaration of war from the Romans.
It is unknown whether or not such a lack of diplomacy reflected Lucullus’ true position or
merely that of an agitated, travel-weary Appius. Left no room for proper negotiation or
compromise, however, Tigranes had no choice but to deny the Romans their prize.
Thus in 69, Lucullus launched the first Roman invasion of Armenia.7
Such a story is noteworthy not only because it marks a turning point in the history
of Rome’s eastern expansion, but also because it provides crucial insight into the
motivations behind those ambitions. Most ancient authors propose that Roman
expansion was ‘defensive.’ In Cicero’s De re publica, the younger C. Laelius boasts,
“Our people has now gained power over the whole world by defending its allies.”8 In
similar vein, Polybius implies that all the Romans wanted was to protect themselves
from their ‘frightening neighbors.’9 Rome did, indeed, in some cases see itself as being
offended or even assaulted by those peoples on its borders. The sources attest as
much. Yet, although diplomatic affronts and hostilities warranted a military response in
some instances, in others they certainly did not. Such insults sometimes merely
provided a necessary pretext for Roman aggression. Appius’ confrontation with
Tigranes, which will be discussed later in greater detail, demonstrates that these
‘incidents’ could be easily manufactured. What then were the real motivations for this
expansion and from where did they derive?
This very question has served as the basis for much recent scholarship. Great
effort has been made to disprove notions of ‘defensive’ imperialism. Chapter 1 will
7

Plut. Luc. 21; App. Mithr. 83.
Cic. Rep. 3.23.
9
Polyb. 1.10.
8
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review this modern literature and then attempt to elicit the true motivations behind
Roman expansion. It will also be necessary to examine the Armenian and Parthian
campaigns of Lucullus, Pompey, Crassus, and Mark Antony. Their eastern expeditions
laid the groundwork for Rome’s future relationship with Parthia and established
precedents that would be carried well into the third century AD.
Review of Literature
Scant research has been done specifically on the territory of classical Armenia.
Scholars more often choose to incorporate its history into broader works concerning
Rome’s eastern provinces and affairs. This topic is also made more difficult by the fact
that the literary evidence which has survived concerning Armenia is disseminated
throughout such a wide range of primary source materials. Thus, this project must first
credit several texts which have proved invaluable for both their critical insight and
guidance through such a complicated topic. These works include: Adrian N. SherwinWhite’s Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 BC-AD 1, Neilson C. Debevoise’s A
Political History of Parthia, and F. A. Lepper’s Trajan’s Parthian War. However, despite
their usefulness, these texts are but merely the most recent interpretation of an
argument which has spanned nearly a century.10
Debates among historians concerning Roman expansion and notions of
defensive imperialism first arose at the end of the nineteenth century. Interest in this
topic, no doubt, stemmed from contemporary efforts to explain or perhaps justify
modern European colonialism. Theodor Mommsen and Tenney Frank are the best
known authors of Roman defensive theory. Based both on literary evidence, such as
10

Sherwin-White Roman Policy; Neilson C. Debevoise, A Political History of Parthia (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1938); and F. A. Lepper, Trajan’s Parthian War (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1948).
6

those aforementioned quotations from Cicero and Polybius, and on other textual
references to longstanding Roman traditions, such as the fetial ceremony, this theory
suggests that Rome’s expansion was the result of its natural response to outside
aggression. So persuasive were Mommsen and Frank that such thinking has
dominated the field of Roman history for much of the twentieth century.11
Only in recent decades have historians begun to question and reevaluate these
ideas. William V. Harris’ War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327- 70 BC seeks
to refute defensive imperialism by emphasizing Rome’s obvious other motivations for
expanding. Besides various economic incentives, Rome’s generals and emperors
longed for any opportunity to further their quests for glory and honor. Harris proposes,
therefore, that Roman expansion was not the latent result of defensive measures, but
rather the aftereffect of a conscious effort to acquire wealth and prestige.12
Other scholars have attempted to attribute an over-arching strategy to the growth
of the Roman state in order to show that its progression was not random or haphazard
as defensive theory asserts. The groundbreaking work that first put forth this idea was
Edward Luttwak’s The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. In it, Luttwak argues that
the development of the Roman frontier can be divided into three distinct phases: an
early period of client states under the Julio-Claudians, an era of ‘scientific’ or preclusive
borders founded by the Flavians and Antonines, and finally a defense-in-depth strategy
adopted during the crises of the third century.13
Although initially persuasive, there are problems with this theory. The two most
recent attempts to refute or to revise Luttwak’s thesis have been Benjamin Isaac’s The
11

Mommsen History of Rome 520-22; Frank Roman Imperialism 8-9.
William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 BC (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1979), 54-67, 105-130.
13
Luttwak Grand Strategy 1-7.
7
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Limits of Empire and Susan P. Mattern’s Rome and the Enemy. One glaring criticism of
Luttwak is that his theory is too generalized. If, in fact, there was a Roman strategy,
how could that single strategy be applied to an empire so large and diverse? Isaac’s
work thus focuses specifically on Rome’s Asian and Near Eastern frontiers. He differs
from Luttwak by asserting that there were no definitive borders in the east. He suggests
rather that “the political boundary of the empire was irrelevant as a concept, and the
military boundary was never organized as a ‘line of defense’.”14 The function of Roman
legions stationed in Asia Minor, Syria, and Judea, according to Isaac, was to serve as a
police force. The local Roman magistrates relied on the army not only to quell potential
rebellions, but also to enforce the collection of tribute. Therefore, these legions were
garrisoned in towns and cities, where they might be more effective for these purposes,
and not on some remote frontier along an imaginary line in the sand.15
Critics of Luttwak also argue that the Romans may have even been incapable of
thinking in terms of geographical or political borders. Mattern points out that Romans
formulated most of their perceptions of other peoples through ethnographic literature.
They spoke of their enemies in terms of tribes and kings, and not as states or kingdoms.
A Roman map, known as an itinerarium pictum or a periplus, usually depicted at best a
crude representation of the Mediterranean basin. Armies or merchants typically
compiled these itineraries to record distances between cities. Mattern suggests that the
Romans, hampered by such inaccurate tools, were unable to clearly define their borders
or to contrive any workable strategies.16

14

Benjamin Isaac, The Limits of Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 3.
Ibid. 3-5, 43-45, 385-86.
16
Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 1-3,
21-23, 24-26, 42-43.
8
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This paper sides with Isaac and Mattern in rejecting Luttwak’s theory of a grand
strategy. However, it also dismisses notions of ‘defensive’ imperialism, agreeing with
Harris and others. Generals and emperors who acted in the East did so on an ad hoc
basis, and not in accordance with some master plan. Rome’s eastern commanders
were often given free rein concerning frontier policy. Left to their own devices, they
pursued the two things dictated most important by their culture, wealth and glory. It
would be prudent here to examine these particular motivations in greater detail.
Luxuria et Avaritia
Despite its staunchly conservative values of stoicism and military preparedness,
Roman society was not shy about its growing affluence. This fact is evident from the
fervent reactions of such noted moralists as Cato the Elder, who advocated a return to
traditional Roman values. Although Cato himself approved of expansion, he feared that
the constant influx of wealth would make his countrymen soft and ill prepared to deal
with their enemies. He had witnessed firsthand the luxuria and avaritia brought about
by the Punic Wars and loathed the ostentation and sumptuousness in which the
Romans reveled.17
Still, Cato’s warnings went unheeded by most Romans who looked upon
expansion as a vast untapped enterprise. For warfare in the ancient world, as long as
one was victorious, benefited nearly all levels of a society. Officers and common
soldiers that made up the conquering army naturally received a portion of the booty.
Yet, a vast amount of the gold and silver plundered was also reserved for the state.
The transport of this bullion, in addition to captives and slaves, was delegated to
merchants, whose class also produced and distributed military supplies. Resident
17

Livy 34.2-4.
9

Romans, especially members of the equestrian class, living among conquered peoples
also grew wealthy as moneylenders, tax-farmers, and slave-traders. Romans must,
therefore, have seen expansion and the accumulation of wealth as being inextricably
connected.18
Treasure stores and slaves were not, furthermore, the only things of value to be
gained from warfare. Since the late first century BC, Rome had been in indirect contact
with Far Eastern states in India and China. These contacts developed eventually into
extensive trading networks; and, by the first century AD, Rome was, indeed, engaged in
costly trade with the Far East. Pliny the Elder lamented: “And by the lowest reckoning
India, China, and the Arabian peninsula take from our empire 100 million sesterces
every year – that is the sum which our luxuries and our women cost us; for what fraction
of these imports, I ask you, now goes to the gods or to the powers of the lower world?”19
The emperor Tiberius too noted this growing trend when he complained of “the feminine
specialty – the export of our currency to foreign or enemy countries for precious
stones.”20 Hoards of early Roman coinage have been discovered in southern India
where pearls and spices were sold to western traders. The anonymous Periplus Maris
Erythraei provides lists of the many goods transported across the Indian Ocean to the
covetous markets of the Roman Empire. Such lists included not only gems and spices,
but also silks, ivory, tortoise shells, and slaves.21
Any hindrance posed to this trade by Parthia and other rival states must have
influenced Roman policy concerning its eastern boundary. Interference there
18

William V. Harris War and Imperialism 56; Sherwin-White Roman Policy 15-17; and Tenney
Frank, “Mercantilism and Rome’s Foreign Policy,” American Historical Review 18 (1912-13): 249-52.
19
Plin. HN 12.84.
20
Tac. Ann. 3.52.
21
Charlesworth Trade-Routes 58-63; Periplus Maris Erythraei (Princeton: Lionel Casson, 1989),
39-43.
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threatened not only the supply of luxury goods, but also the very livelihood of the
Roman aristocracy – the class that not only dictated, but also carried out Rome’s
international policies. To support its sumptuous lifestyle, the senatorial class, which had
long relied on its large landed estates, also became involved in maritime trade. The
Roman elite had, therefore, a vested interest in eastern affairs. From his research on
Roman foreign relations during the Republican Period, Harris concludes that the Senate
annexed territory whenever “it was possible and profitable to do so.”22
The Roman aristocracy was, thus, conscious of the economic benefits of warfare
and did not hesitate when given the opportunity to expand both its borders and its
fortunes. But was this pursuit of wealth the sole driving force behind the imperial war
machine? To think so does seem premature, for in the funeral eulogy of L. Caecilius
Metellus “acquiring great wealth” is deemed only acceptable when done so “by good
means.”23 It would seem then that there was both a right and a wrong way to pursue
one’s fortune, and that Roman values were not strictly defined by economics alone.
Roman morality did have its part to play in the saga of imperial expansion. It is to this
topic that we now turn.
Gens et Patria
The Roman moral code demanded strict allegiance to both one’s family and
fatherland. Every Roman aristocrat did, after all, owe his privileged status to these two
institutions. Bringing honor to one’s household and glory to the state were considered
the greatest of Roman virtues. One could achieve such praise not only by succeeding
in business ventures, but also by winning political elections and securing military

22
23

Livy 21.63; Harris War and Imperialism 105-7.
Plin. HN 7.140.
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appointments. Dedication to the gens and patria was ingrained in the Roman psyche.
It defined who the Romans were; it motivated them to excel.
Roman gentes, or clans, cooperated and negotiated with each other by means of
complicated marriage alliances. Securing a propitious union for one’s son or daughter
could result in lucrative business opportunities or useful political connections. Opulent
dowries also accompanied the most favorable brides. But such prizes were not easily
won by a gens without power and prestige of its own. Thus, young Romans, whether in
politics or in the military, were encouraged to seek public renown, for with fame came
honor and often the best offers of marriage. In a letter describing a suitable husband for
the niece of his friend Junius Mauricus, Pliny spends most of the correspondence
praising the political accomplishments of the potential bridegroom’s uncle, Publius
Acilius, who “passed with the greatest credit through the offices of quaestor, tribune,
and praetor.”24
A successful political or military career benefited not only one’s living relatives,
but also one’s descendents. Roman honor was passed from one generation to the
next. Having even a distant ancestor who was once made consul or commander of a
legion could increase a family’s prestige. The greatest of the gentes traced their lineage
to the very heroes of Rome’s early history. Romans paid homage to these forebears by
displaying images of each household’s most distinguished ancestors.
However, the reliance on ancestry as the defining mark of one’s nobility and
class did not lead to lethargy among the elite. Immense pressure was placed on
Roman youths to equal or to surpass the accomplishments of their forefathers. In a
well-known story depicting proper Roman matronhood, the adolescent grandsons of
24

Plin. Ep. 1.14.
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Scipio Africanus, the acclaimed hero of the Second Punic War, are berated by their
mother Cornelia for not yet having become as famous as their grandfather.25 Behind
the drive for imperial expansion is this very notion of one-upmanship. Rome’s generals
and emperors sought to honor their gentes by winning more battles, conquering more
territory, and plundering more treasure stores than any other Roman had before them.
In addition to honoring the gens, the successful expansion of the Empire also
signified the triumph of the patria and of Roman ideals. Many Romans reveled in the
idea that they were somehow superior to those peoples that they had conquered, and
that this superiority justified Roman hegemony over the entire world. Numerous
references to the fines imperii are found in public prayers, official prophecies, and
honorary inscriptions.26 One such inscription, commissioned by Pompey in 61, claims
that he had extended the imperial frontiers to the ends of the earth.27 In his speeches
against the conspirator Catiline, Cicero declares, “Our empire ends not in any region of
the earth but in the heavens.”28
The very cultural atmosphere of Rome seems then to have promoted expansion.
This fact should not be surprising considering the warlike character of the Roman
people. They did, after all, entertain themselves with the blood sports of gladiatorial
shows and chariot races. But to say that imperial expansion was merely the result of
some sort of bloodlust would be too simplified. Roman honor was based on a complex
relationship between the individual, the gens, and the patria. By winning praise in the
Senate or on the battlefield, a Roman brought honor not only to himself, but also to his
family and fatherland. Both Harris and Sherwin-White agree that, although economic
25

Plut. Tib. 8.5.
Harris War and Imperialism 118-25.
27
Diod. Sic. 40.4.
28
Cic. Cat. 3.26.
26
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factors did play their part in extending the frontiers, it was this insatiable pursuit of honor
and glory that actually drove Roman expansion. It would be useful here to discuss
several of the Late Republican generals who best exemplify such ambitions.29
Lucius Licinius Lucullus
It was perhaps Rome’s conflicted policies towards its new Asian province that
allowed Mithridates Eupator his initial victories. Beginning in 91, the Pontic king
shrewdly annexed Bithynia and Cappadocia with little or no Roman reprisal. His armies
then proceeded into western Anatolia, all the while slaughtering resident Romans and
Italians. These massacres resulted in the First Mithridatic War (89-85), during which
Pontic forces reached as far as Athens before being halted by L. Cornelius Sulla’s five
legions. Mithridates surrendered at Dardanus and was permitted to return to Pontus.
The Second Mithridatic War (c. 83-81) pitted the Pontic king against Sulla’s lieutenant L.
Licinius Murena. However, this conflict was confined to raids and border skirmishes
and was soon abandoned by both sides. Then in 76/75, Nicomedes IV of Bithynia died
suddenly and, as Attalus of Pergamum had done, left his kingdom to the Roman people.
Mithridates again mobilized for war. At the same time, several factions in Rome were
pushing to renew hostilities with Pontus. The Third Mithridatic War initiated by Pontus’
invasion of Bithynia in 74/73, may thus be regarded as a preemptive strike. Mithridates
was well aware that, however haphazard it might seem, left unchecked, Roman
expansion would eventually threaten his own kingdom.30
In 74, both Roman consuls were dispatched to Asia to prepare for the coming
war with Mithridates, although only one, M. Cotta, had originally been selected for this

29
30

Harris War and Imperialism 56; Sherwin-White Roman Policy 15-17.
Sherwin-White Roman Policy 93-121, 149-52.
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purpose. The other consul, L. Lucullus, who had been allotted Cisalpine Gaul,
conspired with his co-consul to secure instead the Asian province of Cilicia. Both men
undoubtedly knew that an eastern war would provide them with more opportunities for
glory and plunder than any pacified western province ever could. This is not to say,
however, that there were not other conflicts elsewhere. Besides the looming problems
in Asia, to which four legions had already been delegated, the empire also had to
contend with tribal revolts in Macedon, rampant piracy throughout the Mediterranean,
and civil war in Hispania. The difference is that these other troubled regions essentially
required police actions and did not provide the same opportunities for prestige.
Resolving civil or tribal disputes could not nearly match saving the state from
Mithridates, whom most Romans regarded as a despotic megalomaniac.31
The first phase of the war commenced, as mentioned, in 74/73 with Mithridates’
invasion of Bithynia. At Chalcedon, the Pontic king confronted Cotta, whom he quickly
defeated. He then laid siege to the port city of Cyzicus, hoping to establish naval supply
shipments via the Black Sea from his other holdings in Colchis and the Crimea.
Lucullus, arriving too late to assist his co-consul at Chalcedon, encircled Mithridates’
army and began a counter-siege. The Romans avoided a pitched battle, while
incessantly harrying their foe’s overland supply lines. Unable to immediately take
Cyzicus, the Pontic forces were eventually beset by hunger and disease. That winter,
Mithridates withdrew to Pontus with but a fraction of his original army.32
Following Mithridates’ retreat, several Roman proconsuls met at Nicomedia to
discuss their strategy. Although the conservative element at this meeting favored a
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diplomatic end to the war, Lucullus and his associates insisted on pursuing Mithridates.
Perhaps Lucullus felt that he had not attained the glory he duly deserved because there
had been no definitive battle.33
In the summer of 71, Lucullus launched his Pontic campaign with the intention of
capturing Mithridates and ending Rome’s troubles in Asia. However, the second phase
of the war proceeded very much as the first had. Lucullus maneuvered swiftly through
Pontus attacking communication lines and besieging cities. Mithridates, seeing that he
had already lost the advantage, decided to fall back even further into Lesser Armenia.
Although the sources concerning this episode are vague, it seems that, at some point,
Mithridates’ army broke down, and what had begun as a withdrawal turned quickly into
a rout. Mithridates and his companions abandoned the field and escaped to Armenia.
With their enemy’s army in such chaos, the Romans moved in to disperse the remnants
and thus, without a single battle, took control of Pontus. Despite his victory, Lucullus
was, most likely, disheartened by these events, for he had lost Mithridates not once, but
twice.34
Lucullus’ disappointment most probably prompted not only Appius’ mission to
Tigranes, but also the harsh terms that were presented to the Armenian monarch.
There is no reason to suspect that Tigranes, once allowed some opportunity to save
face, would not have handed over Mithridates. They were, of course, in-laws; however,
most of the Asian kingdoms were then connected in some way by marriage. Family ties
did not necessarily always assure political alignment, especially with the threat of
Roman aggression looming overhead. The sources emphasize, furthermore, that
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during the preceding war Tigranes remained neutral and lent no aid whatsoever to his
father-in-law. The Armenian monarch had been otherwise occupied consolidating the
northern Mesopotamian territories of Gordyene, Sordene, and Adiabene, which he had
recently captured from the Parthian Empire. An extended conflict with the Romans was
the last thing that he needed or desired.35
Nor may we blame Lucullus’ Armenian invasion simply on the careless arrogance
of the legate Appius. Even if his subordinate had demonstrated poor judgement,
Lucullus was not completely bound by this mistake, for he had, if he wanted, an ‘out’
available to him. He had been given no authority to declare war on Tigranes. Any
punitive expedition that would proceed would do so without the approval of the Roman
Senate. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Lucullus would have risked all merely to
uphold the word of a rash young officer. If he had not wished to make good on Appius’
threat, he had but to point to Roman law, losing no honor in doing so.
Therefore, it may be assumed that the impetus for this conflict lay with the
appetites of Lucullus himself. Besides the obvious prestige of being the first Roman
general to march beyond the Taurus and Euphrates, Lucullus may also have been
tempted by the unimaginable wealth that awaited any conqueror in the numerous
storehouses of the Armenian king. Tigranes the Great, until the age of forty, had lived
as a hostage at the Parthian court of the Arsacid ruler Mithridates II Megas. Being a full
descendant of the Artaxiad dynasty, he was, however, later ransomed (c. 95 BC) in
order that he might assume the Armenian throne. Although he continued to serve as a
vassal of Mithridates II until that king’s death in 88, he eventually became the most
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powerful monarch in the Near East, and ruled the only significant empire the Armenians
would know in the ancient world. Internal disputes among the Parthian nobility allowed
Tigranes to seize first the aforementioned Mesopotamian territories. Soon thereafter,
he also overran Commagene, Cilicia, and Syria. His unrivaled success and boldness
led even to his adoption of the old Persian title ‘King of Kings.’ A victory for Lucullus
over Tigranes would be, therefore, no small thing, even if we ignore the potential
prominence he could attain by also capturing Mithridates Eupator.36
The Armenian campaign, which began in 69, was the first instance in which
Roman forces marched onto the Tigris plateau in southern Armenia. Once there,
Lucullus wasted no time advancing on Tigranes’ capital of Tigranocerta. Unlike the
previous war, however, he was met in battle by a sizable force commanded by both
Tigranes and Mithridates. Although outnumbered, the Romans managed to turn back
the great, oriental army. Yet once again, Mithridates eluded capture, and fled with
Tigranes into the mountains of northern Armenia. Perhaps out of disgust, Lucullus then
proceeded systematically to dismember the very empire of the Armenian king. He first
ordered Tigranocerta completely dismantled and freed the various peoples Tigranes
had enslaved there. He also liberated several northern Mesopotamian territories from
Armenian rule. This last action was, in itself, significant, for doing so marked the first
case in which the Romans involved themselves in the politics of Parthia. Prior to
Tigranes’ occupation, these territories had been vassal states of the Parthian king.
Fortunately for Lucullus, Parthia was then in no condition to oppose him.37
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The Parthians’ reluctance to confront the Romans did not prevent them from
receiving Tigranes’ envoys. This embassy may have even offered the Parthian king
Phraates III the Mesopotamian territories in question in exchange for an alliance against
the Romans. However, the certainty of this allegation may never be known because
upon hearing of these negotiations Lucullus sent his own ambassadors to Phraates.
Following the arrival of the Roman legates, Parthia assumed a ‘watchful neutrality.’38
Most of the sources confirm this series of events, with the exception of Plutarch.
In his retelling, Lucullus foregoes all diplomatic channels and instead plans an outright
attack on the Parthians. Plutarch cites Lucullus’ desire for glory as the reason for his
pugnacity. Yet this attack never occurred because his troops refused to venture any
further into unknown territory. But should we lend any credence at all to this version?
Sherwin-White does not. He argues that Lucullus would never have intentionally
marched on Parthia, which would have left Tigranes and Mithridates at his rear.39
Although this essay too rejects Plutarch’s rendering of events, it does so on
wholly different grounds. Lucullus had already bested Tigranes’ great army and put
Mithridates to flight on three separate occasions. He, therefore, had no reason to fear,
or even to suspect, that they would pose any immediate trouble. Plutarch’s recounting
too coincides more closely with descriptions of Lucullus’ character. Sallust, although
critical of Lucullus, notes, “He was thought outstanding in every way, except for his
extreme desire for extending the empire.”40 Plutarch’s interpretation is dubious
because, of the four ancient authors who deal with this subject matter, his is the only
one in which Lucullus does not attempt to resolve the situation diplomatically. Still,
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although Plutarch’s account might not accurately reflect the chain of events, it provides
us with some insight into Lucullus’ personality and motivations. It is not inconceivable
that Plutarch, in confusing the details, might have fashioned the story around the man.
Apart from this episode, however, there is little doubt as to the events that
followed Lucullus’ victory at Tigranocerta. After resolving the Parthian question, the
Roman army turned again to northern Armenia and Tigranes’ second capital of
Artaxata. Lucullus sought to capture Tigranes and Mithridates themselves, perhaps for
some future triumph he imagined himself receiving. Yet the mountainous terrain of the
region and the guerrilla tactics of the enemy proved too difficult for the Romans. Unable
to reach Artaxata, Lucullus withdrew to southern Armenia where he besieged and took
Nisibis. While the Romans wintered there, Mithridates managed to raise a small army
of his own and marched back to Pontus. He surprised the local Roman commanders
who, like Lucullus, may have never expected to see the Pontic king again. Mithridates
capitalized on this advantage and, at Zela, slaughtered the equivalent of two and a half
Roman legions. He then fell back to the citadel of Talaura in Lesser Armenia to await
Median reinforcements led by Tigranes. Upon hearing the news of this bloodbath,
Lucullus broke camp and prepared to advance against Mithridates. This time, however,
his troops balked. Refusing to proceed as Lucullus commanded, the officers agreed
instead to withdraw to Galatia where they assumed a defensive position. Unhindered,
Mithridates ventured forth from Talaura and retook Pontus. The Roman Senate, which
had not previously interfered, voted to recall Lucullus. His replacement, the famous Gn.
Pompey, was appointed the following year to led Rome’s eastern armies.41
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Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus
In 66 BC, Gn. Pompey was commissioned with the task of subduing both Pontus
and Armenia once and for all. He first assembled troops from the various Anatolian
provinces and combined them with the remnants of Lucullus’ army. Therefore, his
campaign force may have numbered some forty-five thousand at the outset.
Mithridates, who had yet to recover fully from his previous confrontation with Rome,
most likely, was able to muster no more than thirty thousand infantry and two or three
thousand cavalry. Although the sources are unclear, the final battle between these two
armies seems to have taken place in the upper Lycus valley near Nicopolis. The ease
with which Pompey’s legionaries routed Mithridates’ hastily built army demonstrates the
superiority Rome exercised in Asia at this time. Despite this military supremacy,
Pompey was, as Lucullus had been, unable to capture the elusive Mithridates himself,
who fled once again eastward into Lesser Armenia.42
After securing his rear, Pompey rallied his troops, supposedly to pursue the
Pontic king. Ignoring rumors of Mithridates’ presence in Colchis, he proceeded instead
directly to Artaxata. Tigranes, who was then still residing there, rode out to meet the
Roman army as it approached and surrendered in ceremonial fashion to Pompey.
Lucullus’ policies and subsequent withdrawal from southern Armenia the previous year
had created a void of power in that region. Tigranes had been unable to reassert his
influence there and was forced, consequently, to defer to the Parthian monarch
Phraates. Thus pressured on all sides, Tigranes felt that the most prudent act was to
ally himself with Rome. His gamble succeeded because Pompey, although stripping
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him of most of his provinces, allowed him to retain his throne, and thereby become
Rome’s first Armenian client-king.43
As an incentive for his loyalty, Pompey turned over to Tigranes the northern
Mesopotamian territory of Gordyene. Unbeknownst to the Armenians, however,
Pompey had entered into earlier negotiations with Phraates, promising him that same
province. To worsen matters even further, the Parthian army had wasted no time in
occupying it. Upon learning of the Romans’ sudden reversal, Phraates issued an
immediate protest. Yet Pompey was unwilling to debate. He dispatched his lieutenant,
Gabinius, who expelled the Parthians from the region and then, to add further insult, led
a raiding party across the Tigris. Since Parthia had long recognized the Euphrates as
its westernmost boundary, Gabinius’ actions were considered equivalent to an act of
war. Although outraged, Phraates could do little, for he did not yet have the military
capability to oppose the Romans. Still, Pompey’s slight would not be soon forgotten.44
Once the situation had been resolved to his satisfaction, Pompey renewed his
‘pursuit’ of Mithridates. Leaving a garrison in Armenia, he marched north into TransCaucasia and wintered 66-65 in the lower basin of the Kur valley. This region, now
present-day Azerbaijan, was then occupied by two tribes, the Albani and the Iberi. After
minor combat, Pompey forced both these peoples into treaties. The Iberi, in particular,
became ‘friends’ to Rome and, eventually, would prove themselves to be important
allies. Although Mithridates was known to be at Dioscurias in Colchis, Pompey turned
next to the east as if planning to march to the very shores of the Caspian. However,
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within only three days of this objective, he halted and returned to Albania. Mithridates
made use of this window of opportunity to escape by sea to the Crimea. Despite some
criticism from Rome, Pompey broke off his ‘pursuit’ and retired first to Armenia and then
Asia Minor.45
Plutarch insists that Pompey’s activities in Trans-Caucasia, specifically his
subjugation of the Albani and Iberi, were necessary steps in his advance on Mithridates.
David Magie, among others, argues against any such possibility for, as he asserts,
there is no evidence to suggest that these tribes ever intended to ally themselves with
the Pontic king. Magie proposes, instead, that the real motivation behind Pompey’s
campaign was to consolidate the former provinces of Tigranes and to bring Roman
hegemony to the region. In addition to Magie, Sherwin-White claims that Pompey,
unlike Lucullus, was never really obsessed with the capture of Mithridates. His victory
at Nicopolis may have seemed less than gratifying because of the ease with which it
was achieved. Everyone knew, after all, that it was not Pompey, but Lucullus, who
actually reined in Mithridates. Therefore, chasing the Pontic king may have seemed to
Pompey as unworthy of his attention. If he was looking for glory in the east, he would
not find it by sifting through Lucullus’ leftovers. He set about, therefore, extending the
imperial frontiers and in doing so gained his fame and prestige.46
Following his withdrawal from Trans-Caucasia, Pompey spent the next several
years reorganizing Rome’s Asian provinces. In Pontus, he appointed a client-prince
and founded no less than seven new communities. Five of these townships, Nicopolis,
Diospolis, Magnopolis, Neapolis, and Pompeiopolis, were situated along the much45

Plut. Pomp. 34-36; Dio Cass. 36.53
David Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 358-59;
Sherwin-White Roman Policy 195-200.
23
46

frequented coastal trade route from Bithynia to Armenia. The other two, Zela and
Megalopolis, lay on the important commercial road which ran from the Black Sea,
through Amaseia, to Tomisa on the Euphrates. Pompey may have been attempting to
tap into the lucrative trading networks of Mesopotamia. This then raises the question of
Armenia’s economic importance. Did Pompey and subsequent Roman commanders
regard the territory as a necessary link to the commerce of the Far East?47
Sherwin-White thinks this possibility unlikely. According to Isidorus of Charax’s
Parthian Stations, the Silk Road arrived at Seleucia, traveled up the Euphrates to
Zeugma, and then extended overland to Antioch. From Syria, goods were then
distributed throughout the Roman Empire by way of the Mediterranean. Therefore, this
route, which does not venture any farther northwards, would seem to place most
Armenian cities too far afield to be viable commercially. Furthermore, in addition to the
Silk Road, Far Eastern goods were transported by ship across the Indian Ocean and
Red Sea to ports in Egypt or Arabia. This southern route too makes any Armenian
alternative seem, at first, unnecessary.48
But this view does not reflect a consensus among scholars. Both Charlesworth
and Debevoise argue that the internal strife within the Parthian state and the outward
hostility of the Nabataean kingdom of Arabia led Rome to desire its own passage to
India and China. Securing Armenia and territories in Trans-Caucasia may thus have
been an attempt by the Romans to end their commercial dependence on other troubled
regions. Strabo does, after all, make mention of a trade route that ran north of the
Caucasus from the Caspian Sea to the Azof.49 Although the evidence for such a theory
47
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is sparse, it would at least partially explain why the Romans became so obsessed with
the Armenian territory.50
Still, most of the political disruption within Parthia and Arabia which Charlesworth
and Debevoise refer to occurred during the first and second century AD, well after
Pompey’s campaign. It seems, therefore, unreasonable to ascribe these particular
economic motivations to his actions. As Magie and Sherwin-White suggest, Pompey
was more likely interested in furthering his reputation and expanding the Empire for
glory’s sake. In doing so, however, he established dangerous precedents that
eventually led Rome to question its seeming invincibility and led other men, like M.
Crassus and M. Antony, to ruin.
Marcus Licinius Crassus and Mark Antony
While his political partners, Pompey and C. Julius Caesar, were embroiled in the
affairs of Italy and Gaul, M. Crassus sought to win fame for himself farther abroad. In
56, he thus secured the proconsulship of Syria. From this province, he intended to
launch an invasion of Mesopotamia and, as Plutarch recounts, hoped to conquer “as far
as Bactria and India and the Outer Sea.”51 Due to a lack of cavalry, however, Crassus’
first expedition across the Euphrates was limited to the capture of several small cities.
Consequently, he returned to Syria where he spent the winter of 54.52
In the spring of 53, one thousand cavalry reinforcements arrived from Gaul under
the command of Crassus’ son Publius. These reserves, along with those offered by
Artavasdes II, who was then the King of Armenia and the son of the aged Tigranes,
gave Crassus a sizable force. He thus set out undaunted for the Parthian capital of
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Ctesiphon. The course of his march, through southern Armenia into Media Atropatene,
had been adopted after consulting Artavasdes, who himself chose to remain at Artaxata
to defend the eastern front. Meanwhile, the Parthian monarch Orodes II dispatched his
most experienced general, a nobleman known only as the Suren, to intercept Crassus,
while a larger Parthian army led by the Great King himself advanced on Armenia via the
Araxes valley.53
The armies of Crassus and the Suren met near Carrhae. Despite the Romans’
advantage in number, however, they were not able to turn back the Parthians’ cavalry
lancers, or cataphracts. Thirty thousand Roman legionaries were lost on the first day of
battle and several thousand more were slain or captured during the disorderly retreat.
Artavasdes, who claimed to have engaged Orodes’ army, failed to send help. Crassus
was himself killed after being lured away from his camp during peace negotiations. His
head and right hand were cut off and sent as trophies to Orodes in Armenia.54
Scholarly opinions vary as to the underlying reason for Crassus’ failure.
Sherwin-White cites the Suren’s innovative tactics. By using mounted archers in
concert with his cataphract units, he denied the Roman infantrymen an opportunity to
retaliate. On the other hand, Sullivan paints Artavasdes as the betrayer of Crassus.
For soon after Carrhae, the Armenian king entered into a marriage alliance with the
Parthians whereby his daughter was betrothed to Orodes’s eldest son Pacorus. Since it
was Artavasdes who first suggested Crassus’ course through Media Atropatene,
Sullivan suspects some form of collusion between the two kings.55
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Yet if blame is to be assigned for the Roman debacle at Carrhae, Crassus
himself must receive the lion’s share. Prior to his expedition, the Parthians were
favorably inclined to Rome.56 His unjustified attacked can be, therefore, attributed to no
other motivating factor than his desire for fame and fortune. Plutarch notes that
Crassus sought “to make the campaigns of Lucullus against Tigranes and those of
Pompey against Mithridates seem mere child’s play.”57 Instead of besting his
predecessors, however, Crassus succeeded only in tainting Romano-Parthian relations
for decades.
In 37, Marc Antony’s legate Canidius marched into Armenia with four legions and
secured once again the dubious allegiance of Artavasdes. The Romans then subdued
the Iberians and Albanians in Trans-Caucasia, presumably to prevent them from
causing later trouble. The following year the Parthian King Orodes, lamenting the death
of his first son Pacorus, abdicated his throne in favor of another of his sons, Phraates
IV. Although there was no legitimate reason to suspect so, Phraates must have still felt
his new position tenuous, for he immediately ordered the murder of his father and
remaining brothers. Many among the Parthian nobility fled, horrified that they would be
next.58
One such nobleman, Monaeses, escaped to Syria and once there convinced the
Romans to lend him aid. Antony, who was then shoring up Rome’s eastern authority,
welcomed the opportunity to win back Crassus’ battle standards. Due to a strong
enemy presence at Zeugma, however, the Romans were compelled to march first
through Armenia. Artavasdes himself offered to guide the Romans into Parthia.
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Antony, who was probably unaware of the particulars concerning Crassus’ fate,
unknowingly accepted. Ironically, once again, Artavasdes chose the course through
Media Atropatene.59
Instead of marching immediately to Ctesiphon, Antony first besieged Phraaspa.
While the Romans were thus occupied with the city’s defenses, the Parthians began to
harass Antony’s scouting parties and supply lines. The enemy’s strategy proved at first
effective, for the mounting casualties prompted Artavasdes’ quick retreat back to
Armenia. Antony, who was not dissuaded by these initial losses, chose instead to
engage the Parthian army head-on. Although his tactics were as flawed as Crassus’
had been, his defeat did not quite mirror the disaster at Carrhae. Still, after a day of
pitched battle and no significant gains, Antony called for the withdrawal to Artaxata.
However, on the march to Armenia, the Romans suffered terrible losses due to Parthian
forays and famine. Of Antony’s original seventy-seven thousand men only thirty-two
thousand survived the harried retreat.60
In 34, as part of the ‘Donations of Alexandria,’ Antony returned to Armenia and
installed Alexander Helios, his young son by Cleopatra, as king. Artavasdes was
imprisoned and later executed; what became of his two sons, Tigranes and Artaxias, is
unknown. But for the next two years, Armenia remained under Roman hegemony ruled
by a military governor.61
Conclusion
The first century BC witnessed both the rise and fall of Armenia’s only significant
empire in the ancient world. The kingdoms of Tigranes the Great and Artavasdes
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represent the ‘Golden Age’ of Armenian autonomy. However, these monarchs could
not overcome their country’s great geographical handicap, its unfortunate positioning
between the ancient superpowers of Rome and Parthia. As that struggle intensified,
Armenia had no choice but to try to ally itself with the stronger of the two. After
Carrhae, that choice seemed obvious. But Artavasdes’ decision to back Parthia would
be Armenia’s undoing.
Neither the Armenians nor the Parthians truly understood the mechanisms of
Roman society – their tenacity and inclination for one-upmanship. Besides being
inherently warlike, Romans were conditioned to believe that there was nothing greater
than winning honor and fame. The failures of Crassus and Antony only made Parthia all
the more attractive to upcoming glory-seekers and fortune hunters. Artavasdes failed to
understand that Carrhae signaled not an end, but a beginning.
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Chapter 2
Parthia and Armenia under the Julio-Claudian Emperors

The Roman Civil Wars (49-31 BC) allowed Parthia an opportunity to make
inroads into not only Armenia, but also Syria. However, its occupation of these
territories was brief. By the end of the first century BC, the Roman emperor Augustus
had reclaimed his Syrian province and had installed a client-king on the Armenian
throne. As per the terms of his treaty with Rome, the Parthian king Phraates IV
returned the Roman battle standards lost by Crassus at Carrhae. This symbolic triumph
proved even more advantageous than Rome’s actual reoccupation of Syria. Augustus’
propaganda machine portrayed his recovery of the standards as his greatest success
yet. His triumphal arch depicts a kneeling Parthian presenting him with Crassus’
standards and eagles. The cuirass of Augustus’ Prima Porta statue too conveys a
similar scene; it is, in fact, a common theme throughout the iconography of his reign.62
In his Res Gestae, Augustus even recalled, “I compelled the Parthians to return the
spoils and standards of three Roman armies and humbly to beg the friendship of the
Roman people.”63
But why did Augustus choose to negotiate the return of the standards rather than
to fight for them? Both Crassus and Antony had seemed so intent on sacking
Ctesiphon itself. Why was Augustus so easily contented simply with an Armenian
puppet regime and a Parthian truce? Augustus’ response to Parthia’s incursions into
Syria and Armenia does, at first, seem uncharacteristic of the typical Roman reprisal. It
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seems, however, less so once one considers his overall policy concerning the imperial
borders. One reason for the success of the early Principate was its consolidation of the
overextended frontier. With only twenty-five legions at his disposal, Augustus had to
develop a method to manage more efficiently remote provinces. He, therefore,
established client-kings in areas such as Thrace, Mauretania, and the Caucasus. His
similar treatment of Armenia may have been part of this same policy.64
This explanation is, however, specious, for it assumes that Augustus and his
fellow Romans regarded Armenia as just another subjugated territory. This is simply
not the case. Armenia was uniquely situated between Rome’s restless eastern
provinces and the rising star of Parthia. Roman literature from this period does, in fact,
portray Parthia less as a mere nuisance and more as a nemesis. The poet Horace
writes even of the “Parthians, now threatening Latium.”65 The general Roman populace
viewed Armenia increasingly as necessary for the defense of the Empire. But was
Rome’s growing fear of Parthia justified or was that perceived threat merely the result of
popular hysteria? And, in either case, was it this fear or perhaps some other factor that
prompted Rome’s interference in the politics of Armenia?
Chapter 2 will attempt to demonstrate that, despite such literature and
speculation, Rome was in no immediate danger from the Parthian state. It will also
make an effort to show that the Julio-Claudian emperors, although more cautious, were
no less eager to win glory and plunder for themselves in the East. It was their
ambitions, and not Rome’s collective fear, that drew the Empire into the affairs of
Armenia and Parthia. Yet due to the debacle at Carrhae and a mounting resentment in
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Rome for such potentially wasteful endeavors, this period is characterized more as one
of political posturing than actual military conflict. The Armenian throne, the key to
hegemony in the region, was of course oftentimes the focus of these diplomatic
maneuverings and intrigues. Yet even in the political arena, Rome’s leaders were more
often than not the aggressors and initiators. The advent of the Principate may have
changed the nature of the game, but the prize was undeniably the same.
Parthia in Roman Literature
Many Romans regarded Carrhae as a great military blunder and an unnecessary
loss. It was, nevertheless, seen initially as a mere setback on the distant frontier and
nothing more. Antony’s failed expedition into Mesopotamia raised further concerns
about the Parthians at Rome, but these concerns were soon overshadowed by the
ongoing Civil War. A real Roman awareness of the supposed Parthian threat arose
only after Augustus’ victory at Actium in 31 BC. As stability returned to the Roman
state, many people were surprised to find that that empire no longer included large
portions of Asia Minor or the vital economic province of Syria. Rome’s attention turned,
therefore, to a new potential danger on its eastern horizon.
Although Augustus soon afterwards recaptured these occupied territories, the
psychological damage had already been done. Romans no longer felt as safe as they
once had under the Republic. For if the Parthians could take Syria, a major Roman
province, then why cou ld they not also invade Western Anatolia, or Greece – or Italy,
for that matter. Horace’s exaggeration of the danger Parthia posed is, in this sense,
better understood. He and his fellow Romans were becoming keenly mindful of the fact
that they were not all-powerful or invincible on the battlefield. Similar opinions and
fears, although some less extreme, are prevalent throughout the literature of the period.
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This growing Roman consciousness of Parthia and of the East is evident in the
poetry of the Early Principate. Besides Horace, both Virgil and Ovid make numerous
references to Parthia, Media, Bactria, and India. Stock phrases, such as the Parthian
bow, the Armenian tiger, the Hyrcanian dog, and many more, persist not only in their
works, but also well into the poetry of the second century AD.66 Propertius mentions
repeatedly Augustus’ possible expedition in the East.67 And Seneca and Lucan still
utilized in their day many of the same catchwords and stock phrases introduced by the
Augustan poets.68 Such specific references to the East must reflect the general public’s
increased awareness of and interest in Rome’s oriental affairs.
Roman writers, furthermore, had a long tradition of labeling those peoples
outside the Empire as inferior and barbarian. Beginning in the era of the Augustan
authors, however, there is an abrupt change. References to Parthia as ‘a Roman rival’
and as ‘another world’ arise. Strabo reports: “… and now they rule over so much land
and so many peoples, that in a way they have become rivals of the Romans in the size
of their empire.”69 Although not a contemporary of Strabo, Dio Cassius too mentions, in
regards to the Parthians, that “they finally advanced so much in glory and power that
they then made war even on the Romans, and ever since have always been considered
rivals.”70 In addition, Dio Cassius, as well as Lucan, convey the sense that the
Parthians had become invincible in their own territory.71 Many Romans would have
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considered these suggestions laughable only a generation earlier when the Republic
was at the height of its power and arrogance.72
The disaster at Carrhae, Antony’s failure to avenge Crassus, and Parthia’s brief
occupation of Syria all fostered feelings of alarm and trepidation in Rome concerning
the East. These feelings were exacerbated by a ubiquitous Roman tendency for
xenophobia and a general sense of anomie, which is not uncommon during periods of
widespread civil strife. Most Romans now believed that they were on the defensive,
beset by the Parthian hordes. But were they? In hindsight, the answer seems obvious.
Of course, they were not. Following the Syrian invasion of 20 BC, no other oriental
army severely threatened the Eastern frontier until the early third century. But does this
striking lack of an outright military conflict necessarily mean that no rivalry existed? The
modern Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union did not, after
all, erupt into a full-scale confrontation. Can this twentieth-century model be applied to
the Romano-Parthian situation in the first century AD? To answer such a question, we
must examine more closely the reigns of the Julio-Claudian emperors, their policies
towards Parthia, and their efforts to secure the much-disputed territory of Armenia.
Caesar Augustus
Shortly after the return of Crassus’ standards in 20 BC, Augustus sent the
Parthian king Phraates IV an Italian slave girl named Musa for his harem. The sources
seem to suggest that this girl was intended as a gift and represented an act of good
faith on Augustus’ part. However, Debevoise is more suspicious of Musa, speculating
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that she may have been a Roman spy sent to influence Phraates. Such a theory is not
wholly unreasonable once one considers some of Musa’s later actions as Phraates’
consort.73
By 10 BC, Musa’s son Phraates V, also known as Phraataces, had become old
enough to contend for the Parthian throne. Musa managed, therefore, to persuade her
husband to send his other children to Rome for safe keeping, leaving her son as the
only potential heir. Four of Phraates’ sons, Seraspadanes, Phraates, Rhodaspes,
Vonones, two of their wives, and four of their sons were handed over to the Roman
governor of Syria. They were then escorted to Rome where they and their descendents
resided for the next half century, enjoying all the luxuries and privileges given to any of
Rome’s royal hostages. This exiled group of Parthian royalty formed a convenient pool
from which the Julio-Claudian emperors later drew their candidates for the Armenian
throne.74
In Armenia, meanwhile, Roman hegemony had become quite tenuous. A party
of Armenian nationalists had driven out the last of Antony’s Roman garrisons there and
had accepted an alliance with Phraates. The current rulers, Tigranes IV and his sisterwife Erato, were briefly deposed in 5 BC by a Roman army under the command of
Augustus’ stepson Tiberius. A Median prince, named Artavasdes III, was installed in
their place. Had Phraates lived any longer Artavasdes’ throne might have remained
secure; however, in 2 BC, Musa murdered her husband, making her son the sole ruler
of the Parthian state.75
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If Musa had originally been a Roman agent, she was one no longer, for prior to
Phraataces’ accession, she convinced the Armenian nobility to rise up against
Artavasdes. In the ensuing revolt, Tigranes was once again crowned as king of
Armenia. Augustus was, nevertheless, soon alerted to these events and dispatched his
grandson Gaius to the eastern frontier. Phraataces, however, was not prepared to go to
war. He met the approaching Roman army in person at the Euphrates and acquiesced
to all of Gaius’ terms. He agreed to drop Parthia’s claim to the Armenian throne and to
allow his stepbrothers to remain as hostages at Rome, a stipulation that was most
probably not altogether heartbreaking for Phraataces or his mother.76
Having secured Phraataces’ consent, Gaius then pressed northwards into
Armenia where he arranged for Artavasdes III to resume the throne. Gaius’ army
remained in the territory for nearly two years, besieging the Parthian-held stronghold of
Artagira and searching for Phraataces’ treasure stores. The sources do suggest that
this Armenian expedition may have been the precursor for a full-scale campaign against
Parthia itself. Seneca notes that Augustus sought to expand the eastern border beyond
the Euphrates.77 But any such plans were abandoned when, in AD 3, Gaius agreed to
parley a truce with the satrap of Artagira. Their meeting, which was intended as a trap,
ended in a fracas in which Gaius was mortally wounded. His death effectively halted
any plan Augustus had to invade Parthia.78
Had Gaius not died, Augustus would have surely added the Parthian kingdom to
his long list of conquests, for it was then in no condition to oppose him. In AD 2,
Phraataces married his mother Musa and thus became guilty, at least in the eyes of his
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subjects, of not only patricide, but also incest. This act, along with his lingering status
as an outsider due to his mother’s Italian stock, soon rallied the Parthian nobility against
him. By AD 4, he had either been assassinated or driven to exile in Syria. His
successor, an Arsacid prince named Orodes III, reigned only briefly until AD 6 when he
too was murdered by his own disgruntled nobility. Upon his demise, the Parthians sent
word to Rome, requesting the return of Vonones, the eldest son of Phraates IV. Since
Vonones had now been living in Rome for nearly sixteen years and was practically a
Roman himself, Augustus was more than willing to oblige them.79
Vonones’ western manners and habits, his disdain for horses and hunting for
example, of course, soon made him unpopular with the Parthian nobility. As early as
AD 9, another Arsacid, Artabanus II,80 who was then the king of Atropatene, began
mustering support to overthrow his distant cousin. Although the first attempt to oust
Vonones failed, a second revolt in AD 12 proved more successful. Artabanus seized
Ctesiphon and drove Vonones first to Armenia, where he reigned briefly after
Artavasdes’ death, and then finally to exile in Syria. Parthia’s new king wasted no time
installing his own son Orodes on the vacant Armenian throne. However, there was
uncharacteristically no immediate Roman reprisal since Artabanus’ coup d’etat in both
Parthia and Armenia occurred some time after Augustus’ death in AD 14.81
It is, of course, debatable whether or not Augustus would have succeeded in
annexing Parthia if Gaius had lived. What seem less questionable were his intentions.
Although no such expedition was ever actually launched, Seneca and Ovid make clear
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the idea that one was planned.82 Besides this textual evidence, common sense would
seem to suggest that Augustus’ constant jostling for position in Armenia also supports
the theory of a possible Parthian campaign. At the outset of his reign, Augustus was
unwilling to risk such an endeavor for fear that it would result in another Carrhae. He
was content to recover Crassus’ standards and to overplay their significance.83 By the
early first century AD, however, Parthia was in political disarray, several members of the
Arsacid royal family were held hostage at Rome, and the Armenian throne was secure
with Artavasdes III as king. Such favorable conditions, no doubt, made Augustus
reconsider a Parthian invasion. Parthia was now, after all, Rome’s only significant rival.
Its conquest would have certainly loomed large before Augustus as potentially his
greatest achievement.
Of course, no such victory was forthcoming after Gaius’ death in AD 3. This
setback may have even contributed to Augustus’ later decision to halt imperial
expansion altogether. Still, his earlier efforts in the East had already set the tone for the
rest of the Julio-Claudian Era. Augustus’ successors continued to plot to have their own
candidates placed on the thrones of both Armenia and Parthia. These candidates were
often the sons or grandsons of Phraates IV whom Musa had sent to Rome, perhaps
under the direct orders of Augustus himself. Rome’s first princeps had been unable to
conquer Parthia itself; however, policies and protocols that he established quickly
became the model on which the later Julio-Claudian emperors based their actions in the
East.
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Tiberius
By AD 18, Tiberius, Augustus’ adopted son and heir, was secure enough in his
position as the new emperor to challenge once again Parthia’s claim to the Armenian
throne. He, therefore, dispatched his own adopted son, Germanicus, to the East with a
sizable Roman army. Artabanus’ son Orodes, who was then serving as the king of
Armenia, most likely fled from his capital at Artaxata as Germanicus’ force approached.
Under Roman auspices, his crown was awarded to the son of Pontus’ king Polemon, a
young prince who soon became known as Artaxias III.84
Germanicus then marched back to Syria where he received Artabanus’
ambassadors, who did not contest the regime change in Armenia. Instead, they offered
to become allies with the Romans in exchange for the silencing of Vonones, who had
been attempting to raise an army in Syria ever since his exile from Armenia.
Germanicus did not officially accept Artabanus’ terms; however, he did forcefully
remove Vonones to Pompeiopolis in Cilicia. Although Vonones managed to escape in
AD 19, he was quickly recaptured and soon afterwards mysteriously assassinated. In
that same year, Germanicus fell ill and died near Antioch, supposedly poisoned by his
rival Gn. Calpurnius Piso, the governor of Syria.85
In retrospect, Germanicus’ mission to the East does seem to have been one of
détente. Rather than provoking the Parthians by reinstalling Vonones on the Armenian
throne, he chose to support a less controversial candidate, Artaxias. Of course, neither
he nor Tiberius could openly agree to an alliance with Artabanus. Parthia was still, after
all, Rome’s greatest enemy. Doing so would have likely invited much criticism from the
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Roman aristocracy. They chose, therefore, to bide their time and to do nothing. This
policy seems to have been successful, for more than a decade of eastern peace ensued
after Germanicus’ death. From AD 19 to 32, Tiberius sent only one short-termed
governor to Syria. He did, nevertheless, receive some criticism at home from Romans
who believed that he was neglecting the frontier. Had the Parthians advanced into
Syria or attempted to retake Armenia during this period, such remarks might have had
some merit; however, this does not seem to have been the case.86
Yet Tiberius’ casual policies towards the eastern frontier were by no means a
permanent solution. In AD 32, Artaxias died, leaving the Armenian throne vacant once
more. Artabanus, who had spent the last decade consolidating his own empire,
occupied the territory and installed his eldest son Arsaces as king. Artabanus had
been, no doubt, encouraged by his recent victories against several hostile tribes and by
the Romans’ seeming torpidity. Tacitus reports that he now considered “Tiberius as old
and unwarlike.”87 The Parthian king was even so audacious as to send an embassy to
the Romans demanding that they return to him the treasure left by Vonones in Syria and
Cilicia. This new found arrogance on Artabanus’ part disturbed not only Tiberius and
the Romans, but also many among the Parthian nobility, who regarded such posturing
as unproductive and dangerous.88
However, there were no Arsacids left in Parthia who could rightfully challenge
Artabanus’ claim to the throne. After nearly twenty years as Parthia’s king, he had
managed to kill or exile anyone who had even remotely rivaled his authority. The
disaffected party in Ctesiphon, therefore, turned to Tiberius for assistance, requesting
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that Prince Phraates, the youngest son of Phraates IV, be sent to Syria. Tiberius
acquiesced; yet Phraates, who was now nearly fifty years old, was already too ill to
make the journey successfully. The aged prince died en route to the East. Undaunted,
Tiberius next dispatched Tiridates, a grandson of Phraates IV, and appointed L. Vitellius
governor of Syria to assist the Arsacid prince on his mission. By AD 35, both men had
arrived at the Euphrates and were preparing to march against Artabanus.89
Meanwhile, Tiberius had also secured a secret arrangement with Pharasmanes,
the king of the Iberians, the Trans-Caucasian tribe which lived on Armenia’s northern
border. In exchange for his allegiance to Rome, Pharasmanes was allowed to depose
Artabanus’ son Arsaces in Armenia and to seize Artaxata for himself. After expelling
the Parthians, he left his brother Mithridates there as king. A Parthian army
commanded by Artabanus’ other son Orodes soon afterwards attempted, but failed, to
retake the territory. Incited by Vitellius’ agents, the Alani, another Trans-Caucasian
tribe, flooded into Mesopotamia unopposed by the Iberians. Vitellius and Tiridates also
chose at this time to advance. Foreseeing Artabanus’ eventual defeat, many Parthian
nobles quickly defected to Tiridates’ camp. Beset by both the Alani and the Romans
and strategically crippled by mass desertions, Artabanus had no other option but to
withdraw. He abandoned Ctesiphon and fled to Parthia’s eastern border.90
Phraates IV’s grandson reigned briefly over the Parthian Empire as Tiridates III.
Like Vonones, however, Tiridates’ western leanings soon irritated the fickle Parthian
nobility, who turned once again to Artabanus. The former Parthian king, who had been
living as a native in Hyrcania, quickly took advantage of his renewed popularity and
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amassed an army of loyal supporters. Tiridates sent word to Vitellius in Syria, but no
aid was to come from the Romans. Tiberius had grown weary of the whole ordeal and,
late in AD 36, ordered his provincial governor to reestablish peaceful relations with
Parthia. Without his Roman allies to rely on, Tiridates was unable to defend his new
capital. In a seeming reversal of earlier events, it was now Tiridates who fled to Syria
before the approaching Artabanus.91
After recapturing Ctesiphon, Artabanus met with Vitellius at the Euphrates.
Although the exact terms of their truce are unknown, not long after this conference, the
Parthian king’s son Darius was sent to Rome as a hostage. It seems probable that this
deference on Artabanus’ behalf was part of a renewed Romano-Parthian peace
agreement. As for Armenia, the sources do not mention any further regime change
during the last year of Tiberius’ reign. It can be gathered, however, that Mithridates
remained in control there since both Tacitus and Dio Cassius later relate an episode in
which the Emperor Caligula removes him from the Armenian throne. It is not outlandish
to believe that the Romans would have left the Iberians in power in Armenia because,
ever since Pompey’s invasion of Trans-Caucasia in the first century BC, that tribe had
been considered ‘friends’ of Rome.92
Although the Romans were now no worse off than they had been, we can not say
the same of Parthia. From the beginning of the Christian era to AD 40, the quick
turnover of Parthian kings and internal strife incited by the nobility had left the country in
a poor economic state. During this period, there are several intervals in which it seems
that no royal coins were minted (AD 7-9, 21-23, and 32-36). In AD 35, in response to
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the volatile economic situation, the commercial entrepot of Seleucia rebelled against the
Arsacids. This city, which was in some ways more vital to the Parthian state than
Ctesiphon, remained in revolt for the next seven years. Arguably, Artabanus’ long reign
did much to alleviate some of the economic hardships; however, any such beneficial
effects were quickly undone during his confrontation with Tiridates.93
Caligula and Claudius
Neither Tiberius nor Artabanus lived long enough to ensure another lasting
peace. By AD 38, both men had been succeeded by less competent leaders. At Rome,
the Emperor Caligula became involved in numerous scandals and sordid affairs, some
so outrageous that even his sanity was called into question. On the other hand,
Artabanus’ heir, a Hyrcanian named Gotarzes II, upon his accession, murdered one of
his brothers and drove the other, Vardanes, into exile. Vardanes’ hastened return the
following year sparked a prolonged civil war in Parthia which lasted nearly a decade.
With such chaos brewing in both the West and the East, it should not be surprising then
that Armenia was soon once again caught up in the troubles of its more powerful
neighbors.94
Although the sources do not mention for what reason, Armenia’s king Mithridates
was eventually recalled to Rome by Caligula and imprisoned there. During his absence,
Armenia was occupied by a Parthian contingent. Upon Caligula’s assassination in AD
41, however, his successor Claudius released Mithridates, who returned to his kingdom
and with the help of his brother, the Iberian king Pharasmanes, regained his throne.
Still, even after Artaxata was recaptured, Lesser Armenia remained in revolt for some
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time and was only finally subdued with great difficulty. Such continued resistance to
Mithridates’ restoration, no doubt, contributed to the timbre of his later reign, which was
often cruel and oppressive.95
Armenia’s distraught nobles, therefore, sent a proposal to Parthia. In exchange
for overthrowing Mithridates, they would be willing to accept a Parthian as their king.
Rather than take advantage of this opportunity, Gotarzes and Vardanes chose instead
to disagree and thereby launched a new round of violence in their ongoing civil war.
However, their protracted conflict did not go unnoticed by Claudius, who ordered C.
Cassius Longinus, the governor of Syria, to cross the Euphrates with several Roman
legions. Claudius hoped that the unstable political situation in Parthia would allow him
to install another Mithridates, the son of Vonones I and grandson of Phraates IV, as king
there. Unfortunately, by the time the Roman expedition reached the northern boundary
of the Parthian Empire, Vardanes was dead, leaving Gotarzes in command of a unified
front. The pretender and his Roman allies were defeated near the Corma River around
AD 50. In order to prevent Mithridates from ever again challenging him, Gotarzes had
his adversary’s ears clipped so that he might never wear the Parthian crown.96
Gotarzes reigned uncontested only briefly following his victory at Corma. In AD
51, he died either of some unknown disease or as the result of a plot against him. His
successor Vonones II, who was also the king of Media, ruled Parthia only months
before passing the crown to his son or brother, Vologases I. Under Vologases, Parthia
would find a renewed sense of stability and vigor. Rather than struggle hopelessly with
Seleucia and other discontent commercial elements, he established rival entrepots,
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such as Vologasia/ Vologesocerta. With a rejuvenated Mesopotamian economy also
came, however, a revitalized military machine and a sense that Parthia finally had the
means to take the offensive against Rome. At no other time during the Julio-Claudian
dynasty would Armenia be so embroiled in its neighbors’ affairs. It is to this
confrontation, between Vologases and his Roman adversary, the Emperor Nero, that
our story now turns.97
Nero
By AD 52, Mithridates’ harsh rule in Armenia had also alienated him from his
brother Pharasmanes, the Iberian king. Since the Parthians had been unable to take
the initiative in that territory, Pharasmanes sent his son Rhadamistus to wrench control
of Armenia from his tyrannical sibling. Mithridates’ forces quickly proved ineffective, and
he and his family were soon besieged at a fortress near Artaxata. Although a Roman
garrison, commanded by the prefect Caelius Pollio, had been stationed there to protect
the Armenian king, Mithridates was unable to match the bribe offered to his defenders
by the Iberians. After several days, Pollio’s greed got the better of him. He handed
over his charge to Rhadamistus, who murdered his uncle and thus seized Armenia for
himself. Ummidius Quadratus, the Roman legate of Syria, made several half-hearted
attempts to recapture the territory, but he eventually withdrew to preserve the peace
once Vologases took the throne in Parthia.98
Vologases had, on the other hand, few reservations about invading Armenia. His
first expedition, which began about AD 52, drove Rhadamistus into hiding and captured
the important Armenian cities of Artaxata and Tigranocerta. However, the Parthians
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were ill-prepared for the bitter Armenian winter. Vologases thus withdrew his forces to
Mesopotamia until the following year when he launched another campaign into
Armenia, now better provisioned. This second expedition too met with little resistance;
and, at Vologases’ behest, his brother assumed the Armenian throne as Tiridates I.
However, news of these events in Armenia did not reach Rome until late in AD 54.99
By then, the Emperor Claudius was already dead, poisoned by members of his
own household. His adopted son, Nero, although young, was soon hailed as the new
Princeps. Nero’s advisors recommended that he take quick and decisive action in
resolving the situation in Armenia. He, therefore, appointed Cn. Corbulo, one of Rome’s
most experienced generals, as commander of the Empire’s eastern frontier. Corbulo
arrived in Syria several months later where he met Quadratus and inspected the legions
there. He found Rome’s eastern army in disarray, unready for the protracted conflict
that he anticipated. He began widespread training exercises and restructured the
cohorts. By late in AD 57, Corbulo felt that his troops were prepared to proceed into
Armenia.100
Tiridates, who knew that he could not succeed in pitched battle against the
Romans, dispatched cavalry units to harry Corbulo’s army as it entered the Armenian
highlands. However, neither these raids nor that year’s difficult winter broke the
Romans’ resolve. As Corbulo approached Artaxata, Tiridates fled, probably to
Vologases’ court at Ctesiphon. So that his adversary might have nothing to return to,
Corbulo then ordered the Armenian capital burned. Despite this loss, Tiridates soon
reappeared at the command of a meager Parthian army and attempted to retake his
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kingdom. Yet his earlier fears proved true, and he was beaten back by the Romans
with ease. By AD 60, Corbulo was in complete control of the territory. Nero thus made
Tigranes V, a grandson of Cappadocia’s monarch, Rome’s new client-king in Armenia.
Corbulo meanwhile returned to Syria where he replaced Quadratus as provincial
governor.101
Vologases received much criticism in Parthia for not offering more aid to his
deposed brother, despite the fact that he had been otherwise occupied with tribal revolts
in Hyrcania at the time. He thus used Tigranes’ invasion of Adiabene in AD 61 as an
excuse to renew hostilities in Armenia. His forces quickly overwhelmed Tigranes’ native
troops and cornered the Armenian king at Tigranocerta. Corbulo, who was a better
logistician than Quadratus, was nevertheless prepared for these events. He instantly
dispatched two legions to assist Tigranes, refortified Rome’s various outposts on the
Euphrates, and sent word to Nero requesting an additional eastern commander.
Realizing that he was outmatched, Vologases broke off his siege of Tigranocerta.
However, refusing to abandon his objective, he sent ambassadors to Rome formally
requesting the reinstatement of his brother as Armenia’s king. Nero, of course, almost
immediately denied his request and instead appointed L. Caesennius Paetus as
governor of Cappadocia to aid Corbulo.102
Paetus, who would ultimately prove to be Rome’s undoing in the East, crossed
into Armenia around AD 62 with the intention of taking the offensive against Vologases.
He first secured Tigranocerta, then proceeded south along the Arsanias River, a
tributary of the Euphrates. Although Paetus had foolishly left many of his best cohorts
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in Cappadocia, his true failings as a field commander were yet to come. His inept
timetable forced him to camp for the winter at the nearby town of Rhandeia. During
these months, his casual attitude towards training and the harsh winter weather
weakened the resolve of his soldiers. As the weather improved, rather than resume his
march, Paetus lingered unnecessarily at Rhandeia.103
Prompted by the Romans’ faltering, Vologases commenced with a preemptive
strike of his own. He launched simultaneous attacks against both Syria and Armenia.
Corbulo, who was already well positioned at the Euphrates crossing of Zeugma, only
narrowly prevented the Parthians from advancing into his province. Paetus was
meanwhile roused to action and took the field against Vologases’ general Monaeses in
southern Armenia. However, the poorly prepared Roman forces were no match for the
crack Parthian troops. After being badly beaten, Paetus retired to Rhandeia with the
remnants of his army. He then further exacerbated the situation by misrepresenting the
severity of his defeat to Corbulo, who therefore did not deem it necessary to send
reinforcements.104
Vologases, on the other hand, was well informed about the weakened Roman
position in Armenia. Upon receiving word of Monaeses’ victory, he abandoned his push
to capture Syria and turned the brunt of his attack instead towards Paetus’ force.
Paetus now had little choice but to swallow his pride. He sent a message to Corbulo
explaining the seriousness of his situation and requested immediate assistance.
Corbulo wasted no time and set out swiftly with several legions. However, his forced
march from Zeugma would be for naught, for within only three days from Rhandeia, he
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received news that Paetus had come to terms with the Parthians. These terms were, of
course, unfavorable for the Romans, who were required to withdraw from Armenia.105
Later in 63, both sides met to discuss a more permanent armistice. Corbulo
agreed to remove Rome’s fortresses on the Euphrates if the Parthians would abandon
their claim to Armenia. Vologases consented and, for the moment, the question of
Armenia’s throne remained unresolved. However, a Parthian embassy, which appeared
before Nero in Italy, soon presented him with an interesting arrangement. If Nero would
accept an Arsacid candidate in Armenia, Vologases would allow the man to be crowned
by the emperor himself at Rome. Although tied by heredity to the Parthian state, this
man would effectively be a Roman vassal. While the idea was much debated, Nero
finally accepted the Parthian offer and eventually approved Vologases’ brother Tiridates
for the position. As a gesture of good will, Tiridates then appeared in Corbulo’s camp in
Syria. He paid homage to a statue of Nero, which was there, removed his diadem and
placed it at the effigy’s feet.106
In 66, Tiridates departed for Italy with a retinue of three thousand guards and
attendants. His overland journey, which lasted nine months, was financed by the
Roman treasury at the staggering cost of 800,000 sesterces per day. Many of the local
towns along his route through Asia Minor and Illyricum held festivities in his honor. But
Tiridates was cautious not to let his celebrated status get the better of him. When he
met Nero at Neapolis, he did obeisance to the Emperor, who rewarded him with a
gladiatorial exhibition. The pair then traveled to Rome where, before a huge crowd of
onlookers, Tiridates proclaimed Nero his master and god. Nero, in turn, replaced the
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diadem which Tiridates had willingly removed and named him as Armenia’s king,
granting him the regalia of his new office. He then bestowed his new vassal with gifts,
which Dio reports were valued in excess of 200,000,000 sesterces. After several days
of revelry, Tiridates left Rome with Nero’s blessing and began the long journey home,
where he used much of the emperor’s munificence to rebuild his capital at Artaxata.107
Nero’s acknowledgement of Tiridates as Armenia’s legitimate ruler was
unprecedented. For nearly a century, Rome and Parthia had been unable to agree on a
single candidate for that throne. Even throughout periods of relative peace, such as
during Artaxias’ lengthy reign from AD 18 to 32, either one side or the other would
remain adamant, refusing to endorse Armenia’s monarch. Nero’s acceptance of a
Parthian candidate, and an Arsacid one at that, is therefore nothing less than a
watershed in the story of Romano-Parthian relations. And although the aftereffects of
Nero’s decision will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter, it is important here
to note that, following Tiridates’ long reign, Rome’s preferred course of action in the
region – which, since Augustus’ time, had been politics and diplomacy – became the
outright use of military force.
Conclusion
Modern scholars are sometimes mistaken when they too quickly credit the
Roman writers with a keen understanding of the classical world. Such is the case when
we examine Romano-Parthian relations during the Early Principate. In several
instances, Roman authors expressed legitimate fears about Parthia’s potential for
conquest. The poet Horace even took time to warn his audience of the threat that
Parthia posed to Italy. However, it should be clearer now that such concerns were not
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grounded in the facts and resulted instead from popular hysteria, which arose following
Crassus’ and Antony’s shocking defeats in Mesopotamia.
Throughout the Julio-Claudian Period, Parthia was hardly the looming danger
that Rome’s writers penned it to be. Due to the fickleness of its nobility, its leadership
was often in shambles; and the constant chaos of its political environment, in turn,
brought its economy to ruin. Even Artabanus’ long reign proved fruitless in the end
once he chose to entangle himself in the affairs of Armenia. Of the numerous kings
who ruled Parthia during this period, only Vologases was able to win any lasting
concessions from Rome. And even then, Armenia could hardly be considered prized
real estate.
Still, the absence of any real Parthian threat does not alter in any great fashion
our modern understanding of Roman expansion in the East. After all, a perceived
danger could just as easily have elicited a similar response. If the Romans just believed
that they were beset by Parthian hordes, they would have acted accordingly. However,
what is important to remember is the fact that individual Romans dictated frontier policy
and not the Empire’s citizenry as a whole. It was the ambitions of Rome’s emperors,
and not the collective fears of its people, that led to its constant interference in the
politics of Armenia and Parthia. That collective fear, real or imagined, merely showed
Rome’s leaders where best to win honor and glory for themselves.
It is difficult then to equate Rome’s actions in Armenia and Parthia with notions of
defensive imperialism. Despite the caveats of its writers, Rome was in no immediate
danger from the East. A more likely reason for its military endeavors in the region
seems then to be those same personal wants and desires discussed in Chapter 1.
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Augustus may have officially halted imperial expansion and in doing so defined the
borders of the Roman Empire, but he could not as easily immure Roman ambition.
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Chapter 3
Trajan’s Parthian Campaign

In AD 72, L. Caesennius Paetus, the Roman governor of Syria, informed the
emperor Vespasian of a potential alliance between Antiochus of Commagene and
Vologases against Rome. Since such an arrangement would threaten the longstanding
Neronian peace, Vespasian authorized Paetus to invade and to depose the
Commagenian monarch. Although Antiochus’ two sons, Epiphanes and Callinicus,
managed to rally a small army against the Romans, their forces were soon
overwhelmed. Meanwhile, Antiochus, who did not share in his sons’ misplaced
confidence, fled to Parthia. Yet because he had not actually taken up arms himself, he
was allowed to surrender to the Roman authorities and to live out the remainder of his
days in Sparta with a considerable stipend.108
This incident prompted Vespasian to abandon the Neronian détente and to adopt
once again a hard-line approach to the eastern frontier. Rather than install a new
monarch on the throne of Commagene, he chose to annex the territory and along with it
western Armenia. This audacious move on the part of the Romans elicited no objection
from the Parthians, who were otherwise occupied defending their northern borders from
marauding hordes of Alani tribesmen. By AD 75, in an ironic twist of fate, Vologases
even requested aid from Rome against these invaders, who had already overrun
Hyrcania and Media Atropatene, deposing there the Parthian king’s brother Pacorus. In
response, Vespasian sent troops to assist the Iberian king Mithridates and to fortify his
strongholds at Metskheta and Tiflis. Vologases hoped that the emperor’s sons, Titus
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and Domitian, would then be dispatched to confront the Alani, but no such expedition
materialized.109
The Parthian king’s ongoing struggle against these northern invaders eventually
made his throne vulnerable to both political and military rivals. Although the literary
sources concerning this period are silent, numismatic evidence suggests that, sometime
around AD 79, Vologases was replaced by someone named Pacorus II. However, the
accession of this new king did not return stability to the Parthian state. Both continuing
pressure from the Alani and the appearance of another contender for the throne named
Vologases III resulted in two lengthy periods (AD 84-93 and 95-105) when no royal
coins were minted for Pacorus at Seleucia or Ctesiphon. Furthermore, Pacorus’ brother
or brother-in-law, a nobleman known as Osroes, began producing coinage bearing his
own image ca. AD 109/10. Eventually Pacorus disappears almost altogether from the
sources, leaving Vologases III and Osroes in a heated contest for the Parthian
throne.110
The internal squabbling of the Parthian leadership did not go unnoticed at Rome.
Towards the end of his reign, Domitian made preparations to invade Mesopotamia. He,
no doubt, hoped to take advantage of Parthia’s fractured political situation. Yet his
plans did not come to fruition, for in AD 96 his unpopularity at Rome resulted in a
household plot against him. However, his death granted Parthia only a temporary
reprieve. His successor, Nerva, paid little attention to the eastern frontier while he
attempted to restore order in Italy and the western provinces. It was perhaps for this
reason that, in AD 110, Osroes felt the moment right to dethrone the Armenian king
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Tiridates, the aged Arsacid appointed by Nero himself, and replace him with Axidares,
one of Pacorus’ sons. This act would be portrayed by Nerva’s heir, the emperor Trajan,
as a defiling of the pact established long ago under Nero. Since Osroes had made no
effort to seek Roman approval for his Armenian appointee, Trajan was able to use this
incident as an excuse to launch his own invasion of Armenia and Mesopotamia.111
Trajan’s Parthian War is, in many ways, the climax of our story. It is the
culmination of nearly two centuries of political posturing and bitter rivalry. Yet it is also,
at the same time, part of our larger theme of Roman aggression, Parthian disunity –
and, indeed, unfulfilled plans. For although Trajan was the first emperor to carry out an
invasion of Mesopotamia itself, he was not the only Roman leader to dream of such a
conquest. Crassus, Antony, Caesar Augustus, Nero, and Domitian all had made similar
plans. Yet, like those of his predecessors, Trajan’s grand scheme for Armenia and
Mesopotamia would ultimately be cut short by unforeseen circumstances – in this case,
his own untimely death.
Chapter 3 will examine Trajan’s campaign, its motivations, and its aftereffects. It
will attempt to portray this particular conflict as merely another instance of Roman
avarice and glory-hunting. Yet it will also draw conclusions from the two preceding
chapters, making a case for on-going Roman aggression throughout the first two
centuries AD. Why, after all, did the Romano-Parthian conflict come to a head here and
now in the second century under Trajan’s watch? And what were the lasting results of
that endgame?
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Optimus Princeps
In the fall of AD 113, Trajan departed Rome by ship for the East, sailing first to
Athens. There, he was met by Parthian legates, who informed him of Osroes’ desire to
avert war. In an effort to mollify Trajan, the Parthian king had deposed Axidares, whom
he now formally requested be replaced with Parthamasiris, another of Pacorus’ sons.
However, if Osroes hoped that this last-ditch act would deter a confrontation with Rome,
he was wrong. Trajan made no attempt whatsoever to acknowledge the Parthian olive
branch, choosing instead to proceed straight to Antioch where he continued his war
preparations.112
That winter, Trajan drew up several legions and auxiliary units from Egypt and
Pannonia. These troops, along with those legions traditionally stationed in Syria, Judea,
and Commagene, made up the brunt of his expeditionary force. In the spring of AD
114, with his army thus assembled, he advanced to Melitene and, from there, marched
unopposed into Lesser Armenia. At Satala, numerous tribal leaders from the Caucasus
region appeared to welcome Trajan and to declare their allegiance to him. The Roman
emperor exchanged gifts with Anchialus, the king of the Heniochi and Machelones, and
held audiences with the rulers of the Iberians, Sarmatians, and Colchians.113
Since Trajan’s arrival in Athens, Parthamasiris too had been attempting to secure
a meeting with the Roman leader. When his request was finally granted, he presented
himself to Trajan at Elegia. In a memorable scene, the Armenian king removed his
diadem and placed it at Trajan’s feet, no doubt hoping to reenact the ceremony of
Tiridates’ investiture by Nero. However, Trajan did not replace the diadem as Nero
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once had done. Instead, the Roman emperor took Parthamasiris’ act as a sign of his
surrender and declared Armenia henceforth a Roman province. Parthamasiris, who
could do little more than protest, was escorted from Trajan’s camp by a Roman cavalry
detachment and slain.114
Trajan then proceeded to consolidate his new province. He appointed a
procuratorial governor, whom R. P. Longden and Debevoise have identified with
difficulty as either L. Catilius Severus, C. Atilius Claudius, or T. Haterius Nepos. All
three men were prominent officials in the early reorganization of Armenia. Trajan also
dispatched Lucius Quietus against the Mardi, a hostile tribe which supposedly lived east
of Lake Van. According to Arrian, Quietus first destroyed this tribe and then garrisoned
an area near the ‘Caspian Gates.’ With the successful subjugation of Armenia and the
surrounding territories, Trajan felt the moment right to accept, at the Senate’s behest,
the appellation ‘Optimus,’ a title which he would prize above all others as a reflection of
his character.115
Despite having thus conquered Armenia, Trajan was not yet ready to abandon
his eastern campaign. He next proceeded southward into Adiabene, intending to
besiege the fortress of Adenystrae, the principle stronghold of Adiabene’s ruler
Mebarsapes. Because Mebarsapes was sympathetic to Parthia, this siege might have
delayed Trajan some time had not a captured Roman centurion named Sentius rallied
his fellow prisoners against the fortress’s garrison. As it was, however, due to Sentius’
revolt, the Romans easily occupied Adenystrae, forcing Mebarsapes to flee. From
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Adiabene, Trajan then advanced to the region near Edessa, where he similarly hoped to
rein in the vacillating Abgarus VII. Although Abgarus had been called earlier to an
audience with Trajan, he had failed to appear. His loyalty to Rome was thus
questionable, and so Trajan felt that a display of force was necessary. Once the full
Roman panoply appeared before Edessa’s walls, Abgarus had little choice but to
comply. He immediately sent out gifts of weapons and troops to Trajan as a sign of his
fealty. Although the emperor returned most of these offerings, he did confirm Abgarus
as Edessa’s phylarch.116
Having thus secured the allegiance of Abgarus, the Romans then moved rapidly,
capturing the cities of Nisibis and Batnae. For these victories, the Senate awarded
Trajan the title of ‘Parthicus’ and issued coins bearing the inscription ARMENIA ET
MESOPOTAMIA IN POTESTATEM P. R. REDACTAE. Despite such encouragement
from Rome, Trajan could not risk proceeding any further during the winter months. He,
therefore, garrisoned Nisibis and returned to Syria to await the spring. Interestingly
enough, however, this decision to retire resulted in the closest call Trajan would have
during the entire campaign; for in the winter of 115, a devastating earthquake struck
Antioch, destroying most of the city. Trajan sought shelter in the hippodrome and, by
doing so, only narrowly escaped death.117
In the spring, Trajan returned to Nisibis and began preparations to restart the
campaign. He first inspected a fleet of boats, which he had ordered his soldiers to
construct during his absence. This fleet was then carried overland from Nisibis to the
Tigris where it was used to cross the river. Trajan quickly recaptured Adiabene, which
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had recently fallen to Osroes, and officially converted the territory into the new Roman
province of Assyria. All evidence then points to a long Roman march down the
Euphrates River during which Trajan visited Phaliga, Dura-Europus, and Tyre. A fleet
similar to the one constructed at Nisibis sailed alongside the advancing army. Just
north of Ctesiphon, this flotilla was transferred to the Tigris in preparation for Trajan’s
attack on the Parthian capital.118
However, these elaborate maneuvers proved unnecessary, for Ctesiphon fell
without much resistance. Osroes, who was then in control of the city, had fled prior to
the Romans’ arrival, leaving behind not only his famous golden throne, but also his
daughter. On February 20, 116, Trajan entered the city as a true conqueror amidst the
cheers of his soldiers and commanded that a heavy tribute be imposed on his new
subjects. His victory was honored by the Senate, which issued coins displaying his
image and the inscription PARTHIA CAPTA. Although no mention is made of nearby
Seleucia, numismatic evidence suggests that Pacorus was still in power there.
Debevoise speculates that Trajan may have reached some agreement with the divested
Parthian monarch. Perhaps Trajan spared Seleucia because he intended to use
Pacorus in his later restructuring of the Parthian kingdom.119
Such a line of inquiry is, however, a moot point, for dramatic events which
followed Ctesiphon’s fall soon overshadowed any plans Trajan may have had to rebuild
the war torn kingdom. That winter, Trajan sailed down the Tigris and occupied the cities
of Akra, Oratha, and Apamea. He journeyed to the Persian Gulf and, on his return
voyage, stopped at Babylon where he visited the supposed room in which Alexander
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the Great had died. While at Babylon, Trajan first learned of widespread rebellion in
northern Mesopotamia. Most of these revolts were local uprisings prompted by Osroes’
brother Mithridates, who had recently recaptured large tracts of Roman territory.
Although Mithridates was soon killed in an equestrian accident, his son Sanatruces
continued to defy Roman authorities and to incite further pro-Parthian resistance.120
Trajan dispatched his generals Appius Maximus and L. Quietus to quell these
revolts. Although Maximus died while fighting somewhere near the Taurus, Quietus
succeeded in reconquering most of central Mesopotamia. Besides retaking Nisibis, he
also razed Edessa, which once again had taken up the Parthian banner. He put down
its rebelling Jewish population and drove the traitorous Abgarus into exile. However,
Quietus’ tenuous position in the upper Euphrates valley was still vulnerable to
Sanatruces’ counterattack. Osroes thus sent a large Parthian army commanded by his
son Parthamaspates to reinforce his nephew. Yet fortunately for Quietus, this Parthian
prince was more pragmatic than loyal. He struck a deal with Trajan, offering his
alliegance in exchange for the Parthian throne. Thus, Parthamaspates and Quietus
combined their forces and together defeated the remnants of Sanatruces’ struggling
army.121
However, resistance to Roman occupation continued to plague Trajan even after
the collapse of Sanatruces’ rebels. In Armenia, Sanatruces’ son Vologases III
orchestrated a successful revolt against that province’s local administrators. Since
Trajan was otherwise occupied besieging the Parthian stronghold of Hatra and had no
more manpower to spare, he granted Vologases a considerable portion of Armenia in
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return for amicable relations. When a dearth of supplies then forced him to quit his
siege, Trajan decided to recall all but his northernmost troops from Mesopotamia. He
intended to return the following year to shore up his newly won provinces and to restart
the campaign wherever necessary; however, his health, which had been steadily
deteriorating for several months, soon forced him to abandon any such plans. While
preparing to sail home to Italy in August of 117, his chronic illness finally overcame
him.122
The Case for Premeditation
Our account of Trajan’s Parthian campaign is derived primarily from two classical
texts – Arrian’s Parthica and Dio Cassius’ Roman History. However, despite their
incalculable historic value, both sources possess a key fault which cannot easily be
overlooked. The relevant passages in Arrian’s and Dio’s works, which were preserved
mainly due to the efforts of the tenth-century Byzantine culturist Constantine VII, exist
today only in the form of fragments and epitomes. Consequently, our picture of Trajan’s
Parthian war is, at best, an incomplete one. Yet the scanty evidence available has not
deterred scholars from attempting to extrapolate the true causes of the war. It
behooves us now to examine some of these theories, their merits, and their relevance
to our overall theme of Roman aggression.
In his 1931 paper titled “Notes on the Parthian Campaigns of Trajan,” R. P.
Longden reviewed Pliny’s Bythinian Letters, hoping to disprove popular notions that
Trajan had long planned to invade Mesopotamia. Longden’s fellow academics123, who
desperately sought to ascribe premeditated motives to Trajan’s actions, had previously
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used passages in Pliny to these ends. In Epp. xxvii and xxviii, for example, Pliny grants
his procurator Maximus an extraordinary amount of grain for distribution among his
soldiers. Proponents of a case for premeditation suggest that this extra grain might
have been used to feed troops mobilizing for a large-scale campaign. And since these
letters are dated as early as AD 111, it might seem as though Trajan was planning a
preemptive strike against the Parthians. However, as Longden points out, drawing this
conclusion from such circumstantial evidence is not only dangerous, but also foolish.
The additional food stuffs could just as easily have been intended for storage in the
provincial granaries.124
Furthermore, in Epp. lxiii, lxiv, and lxvii, Pliny relates an incident in which an
imperial freedman named Lycormas requested that an embassy from the kingdom of
Bosporus be detained in Bithynia until his arrival. Although some scholars have
interpreted this episode as a race between Lycormas and the Bosporans to report
urgent news from the eastern frontier to Trajan, Longden thoroughly dismisses such an
explanation. Instead, he suggests that Lycormas had somehow fallen out of favor with
the Bosporan king, who was attempting to relay the freedman’s indiscretion to Roman
authorities. And finally, in Ep. lxxiv, Pliny apologizes to Trajan for delaying a messenger
named Callidromus, who had learned that the Dacian king Decebalus was sending gifts
to the Parthian court. Advocates of the premeditation argument claim that this
correspondence proves Trajan had good reason to contemplate an invasion of Parthia.
Although Longden agrees, he is careful to point out that the letter does not include the
emperor’s response to this disturbing news. Perhaps upon hearing of Decebalus’
possible alliance with Parthia, Trajan did, indeed, begin planning his future conquest of
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Mesopotamia; or, as Longden suggests, perhaps he did nothing at all. Without that
crucial piece of information, this letter cannot be used to either prove or disprove a case
for premeditation.125
Longden’s rejection of so-called ‘premeditated’ evidence in Pliny’s Bithynian
Letters eventually gave rise to what has become known as the frontier theory.
According to this view, Trajan never intended to invade Mesopotamia. Originally, he
merely sought to retake Armenia and to restore Rome’s eastern borders. Only after
doing so, did he eventually realize his folly, for he suddenly came to regard Parthia as a
continual threat to Roman security. For lack of any evidence to the contrary, Longden
thus sees Trajan’s Mesopotamian campaign as an impromptu undertaking and not as
the result of a purposed war. Yet such a theory, while tempting, does not take into
account our modern understanding of the Roman psyche or our knowledge of Trajan’s
personality. Just because Longden found no concrete evidence proving premeditation,
are we really to assume that Trajan only realized the danger Parthia posed after his
recapture of Armenia? To think so would certainly seem to be giving Trajan less credit
than he deserves.126
In 1937, however, J. Guey published his paper “Essai sur la guerre parthique de
Trajan (114-117),” in which he attempted to explain the war as the result of Trajan’s
excessive greed. Guey proposes that, following the Dacian war, the emperor needed a
new source of wealth to continue his elaborate building projects, such as his forum in
Rome. This economic view of the war also suggests that Trajan may have been trying
to commandeer Parthia’s all-important trade routes to the Far East. He had, after all,
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already annexed the Nabataean kingdom in 106, probably for these same purposes.
But if this theory is correct, then Guey would need to demonstrate that Trajan intended
all along to invade Parthia. Therefore, his paper takes up once again the challenge of
proving premeditation.127
Unfortunately, Guey relies heavily on Pliny’s letters, yet does not offer much to
refute Longden’s arguments. Instead, he introduces other evidence of troop
deployments to buttress his own theory of premeditation. For if it could be shown that
Trajan dispatched a large number of soldiers to the eastern front prior to the beginning
of the war in 113, then there would be no question about his ultimate intentions. He
would have done so only if he had planned to engage a substantial force during the
course of a prolonged campaign. As proof, Guey cites an inscription from Ancyra,
which describes the prestigious career of Tiberius Julius Severus, a local man who
became a prominent public official during the reigns of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius.
The closing lines of the inscription mention that Roman troops wintered at Ancyra during
a ‘Parthian war,’ which Guey claims could have only been Trajan’s. Although there is
no evidence pinpointing an exact date, he insists that this quartering must have
occurred before 113. A similar inscription from Thyateira also records Roman troop
deployments, possibly in Galatia, during the second century. Guey argues that the
specific legions mentioned in the inscription were only utilized during Trajan’s campaign,
but there is no real proof that these forces were not also used later in either Hadrian’s
Jewish war or L. Verus’ own Parthian expeditions.128
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On the other hand, F. A. Lepper’s Trajan’s Parthian War (1948) does not
completely endorse either Longden or Guey’s views. Lepper sees the frontier theory as
too simplistic and believes that it fails to take into account the Roman predilection for
glory-hunting and plundering. Yet, on the other hand, he regards the economic theory
as equally flawed, for he does not consider the evidence convincing enough to support
Guey’s conclusions. Lepper seems instead to favor the opinions of more contemporary
writers, such as Dio Cassius and Dio Chrysostom, who insist that Trajan invaded
Mesopotamia primarily for the purpose of winning fame and prestige.129
Lepper is careful to point out that Trajan was, prior to his Parthian campaign,
rarely accused of egoism or vainglory. Of the numerous titles voted to him by the
Senate, he prized ‘Optimus’ above all the rest specifically for its non-military
connotations. So why then does Dio Cassius say, in regards to Trajan’s eastern war,
that his “real reason was a desire to win renown,” even though such a statement
blatantly contradicts everything that is known about the emperor’s character? Most
modern scholars simply dismiss Dio’s comment as an unfounded accusation
disseminated later by Hadrian’s administration to show Trajan’s conquests as a
mistake. However, Lepper proposes that Dio’s remark, although inconsistent, may in
fact be true, once we take into account Trajan’s failing health and mental state. The
emperor’s symptoms, a loss of strength, dropsy, and partial paralysis as the result of a
stroke, do after all suggest the onset of heart failure, perhaps even accompanied by
mental impairment.130
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Lepper’s theory is further corroborated by the remarks of Dio Chrysostom, who,
in his fourth kingship oration, plainly compares Trajan to Alexander the Great.
Chrysostom boldly accuses Alexander, and thus Trajan himself, of being a ‘slave to
glory’ and, as Lepper suggests, ‘burning to conquer Babylon and Persia.’ We know that
Trajan held the Macedonian conqueror in high esteem, for after his trip to the Persian
Gulf he took time to visit Alexander’s death-chamber. However, the fact that this
speech may have been performed for Trajan on his birthday in 103 or 104 has led
scholars, such as J. Moles, to believe that critical remarks such as these were most
probably added in at some later time. Yet, regardless of whether or not the Emperor
was privy to these specific comments, the implications are obvious. Chrysostom, like
Dio Cassius, probably looked upon Trajan as a glory-hunter, someone overly concerned
with his reputation and legacy.131
But are we simply to ignore suggestive statements in Pliny’s letters or
inscriptions, such as those cited by Guey, just because they cannot be easily
substantiated elsewhere? Lepper certainly does not think we should. In fact, he freely
admits that Trajan may have had other secondary motivations for conquering Parthia,
including those proposed by Longden and Guey. His argument is able to allow for such
possibilities because his theory does not hinge on the idea of premeditation. Perhaps
Trajan long planned to invade Mesopotamia; or perhaps he only chose this course
following the collapse of resistance in Armenia. In either case, Lepper sees the pursuit
of glory ultimately as the driving force behind Trajan’s actions.132
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However, our purpose in reviewing these theories is not to debate further
Trajan’s motivations. Obviously, due to the absence of new evidence, any additional
discussion of the topic would, at best, be only speculatory. Our intent is rather to
emphasize the general lack of responsibility for the war that modern scholars ascribe to
Parthia. Despite the fact that Osroes was technically guilty of breaking the Neronian
peace, none of the historians mentioned here seem to blame him for the war itself. How
could they, considering that the Parthian embassy which met Trajan at Athens tried so
desperately to dissuade him from engaging in further hostilities? Osroes was then still
trying to consolidate his own powers and defeat his rivals, Pacorus and Vologases III.
Why would he have, at that moment, risked everything by intentionally provoking
Rome? Indeed, what is interesting here about Longden, Guey, and Lepper’s theories is
not their differences, but rather their one particular similarity. For whatever reason they
might choose, each author places the lion’s share of blame for the war wholly on
Trajan’s shoulders. Such a consensus would seem then to support our broader
argument that Rome was, in fact, the aggressor, and not simply defending its territory
from an impending Parthian threat.
The Fall of the Arsacids
Despite the Senate’s perpetual adulation, not all Romans favored Trajan’s
campaigns in the East. Some critics warned that, by establishing provinces in far off
Mesopotamia, Trajan had succeeded only in dangerously overextending the effective
range of the Roman military. Trajan’s adopted son and successor, Hadrian, seems to
have shared this opinion, for he soon withdrew completely from Mesopotamia,
abandoning all provincial claims to the region. In its weakened state, the Arsacid
dynasty was unable to recover fully from the sudden power vacuum that this withdrawal
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created. Its enemies, which were now quite numerous, continued to harass the
beleaguered kingdom, detaching from the empire crucial territories such as Bactria.
During the next century, several Roman emperors, such as Lucius Verus, Septimius
Severus, and Caracalla, further contributed to this process by mounting their own
‘Parthian’ expeditions. We will now examine briefly their campaigns and the collapse of
the Arsacid state.133
The ongoing struggle for power in Parthia between Osroes and Vologases II
continued through much of the remainder of Hadrian’s reign. During this period,
Armenia held ostensibly a semi-independent status, after Vologases’ departure from
that territory following the Roman withdrawal. However, in 128/29, Osroes was finally
defeated, clearing the way first for Vologases and then for his successor Vologases IV
to take the throne. During the rule of the Roman emperor Antoninus Pius (138-161),
this Vologases seems to have done little worthy of record, for the classical writers make
few references to Parthia at this time. Debevoise suggests that Pius may have even
used his influence to secure some type of truce in Mesopotamia. If so, then this would
explain why Pius’ death in 161 so emboldened Vologases, who quickly dispatched
troops to Armenia to reestablish Parthian hegemony there. Had the Parthians stopped
then at Armenia, there might not have been any immediate Roman reprisal, for the
empire was in a state of transition. However, the crushing defeat of the Roman legate
C. Severianus only further encouraged Vologases’ general Osroes, who wasted no time
marching his army across the Euphrates into Syria.134
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Pius’ successor Marcus Aurelius could not allow such an outrage to go
unpunished. He, therefore, sent his co-emperor Lucius Verus to the eastern front with
the authority to launch a full-scale campaign against Parthia. In 163, Verus, who
directed most of this operation safely from Antioch, ordered his general Statius Priscus
into Armenia. Priscus’ forces were made up not only of Rome’s various oriental
contingents, but also of several legions transferred from the Rhine and Danube.
Vologases’ troops in Armenia proved no match for such a formidable Roman army and
surrendered Artaxata without much resistance. Priscus then installed the Roman clientking Sohaemus on the Armenian throne.135
A year later, Verus also dispatched another of his generals, Avidius Cassius, to
Mesopotamia. After several hard-fought battles, Cassius reached Ctesiphon and
Seleucia, which he besieged and then razed. However, unfortunately for the Romans,
an epidemic soon spread throughout their ranks, killing many and forcing them to
withdraw. By 166, the Parthians had apparently retaken much of their lost territory, for
the Roman appointee in Armenia Sohaemus was driven to exile in Syria. Although
Verus launched a brief counter-offensive, which recaptured Edessa and Nisibis, his
plans to occupy all of Mesopotamia were soon abandoned.136
Although Verus’ Mesopotamian campaign fell far short of its projected goal, we
must not view it as a complete Roman disaster. For while it is indeed true that Verus’
legions suffered terrible losses, we must not forget too that Parthia’s armies were also
greatly depleted. Yes, of course, Vologases narrowly managed to retain his throne, but
at what cost? After 166, Parthia would never again hold territory west of the Khabur
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River, and cities such as Edessa, Nisibis, and Carrhae would fall even more under
Roman influence. Verus’ war, although fleeting, marks a crucial step in the decline of
Arsacid Parthia.137
Parthia’s troubles were further compounded by the poor decisions of its next
ruler, Vologases V, who had usurped his namesake’s throne in 191. Two years later,
when Marcus Aurelius’ son and heir Commodus was assassinated, Vologases chose,
along with several of Rome’s eastern vassals, to back Pescennius Niger of Syria in his
contention for the emperorship. This decision proved to be disastrous for Parthia, for
Niger was soon defeated by the African Septimius Severus, who wasted no time
mounting a punitive expedition against the ‘treasonous’ Vologases. By 196, Severus
had captured much of northern Mesopotamia and was poised for an attack on Parthia
itself, when news arrived of a widespread revolt in Gaul. He, therefore, garrisoned
Nisibis and return westwards to deal with the rebelling province.138
In 197, Severus returned to Mesopotamia with three newly-formed legions: the I,
II, and III Parthica. He relieved Nisibis’ commander Laetus, who had won great fame
among the soldiers after repelling several Parthian assaults against the city. During
Severus’ absence in Gaul, the Parthians had seized much of the surrounding territory
and may have even, if we are to believe Herodian, retaken Armenia. However,
whatever boldness Vologases had found was soon lost upon Severus’ return, for the
Parthians quickly dispersed before the Romans’ advance. Perhaps in imitation of
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Trajan’s campaign, Severus had his armies construct a fleet of swift boats, which they
then used to navigate down the Euphrates, capturing Seleucia and Babylon.139
Dio reports that Severus next unleashed his troops on Ctesiphon solely for the
purpose of plundering the capital. Severus, who it seems had no intention of
establishing a permanent Roman presence in Mesopotamia, did not even bother to
pursue Vologases, who had fled prior to the Romans’ arrival. Instead, with much of
Ctesiphon ablaze, he ordered a general withdrawal, leaving Parthia’s great cities in ruin.
But before leaving, Severus also tried to besiege Hatra, perhaps hoping to succeed
where Trajan had failed. Like Trajan, however, Severus was unable to force the city
into submission and succeeded only in losing many men and supplies.140
But much like Verus’ campaign, Severus’ expedition can be viewed as a success
in a roundabout way. It is, of course, true that the Romans failed to capture Vologases
or even to acquire any new territory; but, as we have seen, this was most probably not
their intention. Rather, Severus sought to punish the Parthians for their ill placed faith in
Niger. It is, in these regards, that Severus most surely succeeded, for any political or
economic ground Vologases had regained during his reign was once again lost.
Parthia’s capital was wrecked; much of its population either slaughtered or enslaved.
And with its infrastructure in shambles, many of the kingdom’s vassals took the
opportunity to assert their independence.
In ca. 207/8, Abgarus IX of Osrhoene broke from his Parthian vassalage and
began expanding his kingdom’s territory. However, his bid for independence was ill
conceived, for he mistakenly assumed that Parthia, rather than Rome, was still his
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immediate sovereign in the region. When he appeared before Rome’s new emperor
Caracalla to discuss their countries’ mutual affairs, he was seized and imprisoned.
Thus, Caracalla brought Osrhoene completely under Roman sway, further paring down
Parthia’s once-great empire. When Khusrau I, the king of Armenia, tried similarly to
affirm his state’s independent status, Caracalla used the same ruse to capture that
kingdom’s royal family. Unlike Osrhoene, however, the Armenians did not submit,
forcing the emperor to dispatch his general Theocritus. Yet the Armenians, perhaps
more inspired than demoralized by the loss of their beloved king, proved too much for
the Romans, who were sorely defeated.141
Meanwhile, in Parthia, Vologases was succeeded by his son, the sixth of the
same name. Yet a rift soon developed between Parthia’s new king and his brother,
Artabanus V, the ruler of Media. This fraternal dispute was soon brought to the
attention of Caracalla, who needed just such an opportunity to redeem himself after the
debacle in Armenia. As Parthia prepared for another prolonged civil conflict, Caracalla
sent a message to Media’s capital Ecbatana, demanding that Artabanus’ daughter be
given to him in marriage. Dio reports that this supposed attempt at an alliance was
merely intended as a pretext for war, which was quickly demonstrated by the fact that
Caracalla soon began ravaging portions of northern Mesopotamia. Herodian’s version
of events, although less plausible, is certainly more dramatic, for he records an episode
in which Caracalla’s proposal is at first accepted. The emperor’s entourage then travels
to Artabanus’ court where they partake in an elaborate wedding feast. However, during
this celebration, the Romans ambush the Parthian guests, who are of course too
inebriated to defend themselves. But while Herodian’s story is most probably fictitious,
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it is likely that Caracalla spent some time laying waste to Media and its surrounding
territory until his assassination in 217. Coins from this period, baring the inscription
VIC(TORIA) PART(HICA), seem to corroborate such events.142
Caracalla’s expedition into Mesopotamia marks the last Roman invasion of
Arsacid Parthia. By 220, the kingdom’s long history of civil strife and repeated foreign
occupation had taken its toll. Many of the Arsacid dynasty’s vassals no longer had
confidence enough in Vologases or Artabanus to warrant their continued support. A
movement for new leadership, initiated by Ardashir of Persis, soon arose which grew
rapidly among Parthia’s disgruntled nobility. In 222/23, Ardashir’s coalition defeated
Vologases and took control of Seleucia and Ctesiphon. Five years later, Artabanus was
also slain, making Ardashir the sole ruler of all Parthia.143
The Sassanid dynasty, which Ardashir founded, proved to be a much more
formidable opponent for Rome. In the years to come, Ardashir and his son Shapur I
reconquered nearly all of Mesopotamia. In 258/59, Shapur even managed to capture
the Roman emperor Valerian in battle near Edessa. At Naqsh-i Rustam and Bishapur,
this scene is depicted by carvings which show the subjugated Valerian kneeling before
his conqueror. Although the Armenian evidence is sparse concerning this period,
Moses of Khorene records an episode in which the Sassanid ruler, who was most
probably Shapur, orchestrates the assassination of Armenia’s king. A Sassanid was
then placed briefly on that kingdom’s throne. And we can further assume, from the
continual pressure that Shapur and his successors place on the Roman provinces of
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Syria and Asia Minor, that Rome had little time and few resources necessary to concern
itself any longer with such remote territories, as Armenia.144
Conclusion
There is much speculation about why Trajan invaded Mesopotamia. As Guey
suggests, perhaps he sought viable trade routes to the Far East; or as Dio Cassius
asserts, perhaps he intended only to win fame and glory for himself. In any case, no
historian, either classical or modern, blames Parthia’s king Osroes specifically for
inciting this round of conflict. Thus Trajan’s Parthian war can be seen as just another
instance of unjustifiable Roman imperialism.
But it can also be viewed as the culmination of nearly two centuries of political
posturing and military rivalry. Ever since Crassus’ defeat at Carrhae, Rome’s generals
and emperors had dreamt of reining in Parthia. Because of the ever-growing fear at
Rome of the impending Parthian threat, no other act could win for them such renown.
Their constant interference in Parthia’s internal politics crippled the kingdom’s
infrastructure, weakening the resolve of its military and undermining the authority of its
ruling dynasty. By Trajan’s era, the Parthian state had already endured countless civil
disputes and barbarian raids, such as those of the Alani. Thus the kingdom was ripe for
the taking.
Furthermore, Armenia’s part in these Roman conquests should now be clearer,
for nearly all of Rome’s campaigns into Mesopotamia began with the subjugation of that
territory. Pompey, Crassus, and Antony each occupied it before proceeding with their
respective expeditions. The Julio-Claudian emperors all conspired to have client-kings
placed on its throne. And Trajan, who immediately recognized its strategic importance,
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even attempted to provincialize it. Armenia was the gateway to the riches of the
Parthian kingdom; and it therefore became the staging ground for Roman leaders who
sought to win triumphs for themselves in the region.
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Epilogue

The Emperor Marcus Aurelius laments in his Meditations, “Time is a violent
torrent; no sooner is a thing brought to sight than it is swept by and another takes its
place.”145 His insight fittingly describes not only Armenia’s unstable political situation
during the first two centuries AD, but that of the entire Near Eastern world at this time.
Thus, the rise of the Iranian Sassanids ushered in yet a new era for both Rome and
Armenia, although not how we might assume. For although the Arsacids had been
ousted from Mesopotamia, they continued to rule in Armenia until the mid-fifth century,
winning for that kingdom an autonomy unknown since the reign of Tigranes the Great.
The success of the Arsacids in Armenia only further supports our thesis, for it suggests
that they were not inherently bad rulers. Their poor performance as Parthia’s kings
stemmed not from any innate lack of ability, but from the constant interference of Rome.
Yet Aurelius’ portent would eventually be as true for Rome as it was for the Near
East, for the Empire would not weather the third century well. Besides the looming
Sassanid threat, Rome’s emperors also had to deal with barbarian invasions, rampant
inflation, and incessant plots against the throne. All things more characteristic of the
Parthian state only a century earlier. The Roman psyche, its predilection for oneupmanship, had indeed won the Empire a venerable place in history. But that same
psyche, inundated by paranoia and greed, would also be the cause of Rome’s undoing.
Armenia, Parthia, and the rest of the Near Eastern world were but casualties of the
Roman Empire’s stellar rise and fall.
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Appendix 1: List of Rulers

Armenian Kings
The Artaxiad Dynasty:
Artaxias I
Tigranes I
Artavasdes I
Tigranes II the Great

190-159
159-123
123-95
95-55

Artavasdes II

55-34

Artaxias II
Tigranes III
Tigranes IV and Erato

33-20
20-10
10-5 and 4-1

Artavasdes III
Ariobarzanes

5-4
3-1

Founded first Armenian dynasty
Rules Armenia’s only empire in
the ancient world; Defeated by Lucullus
and Pompey but allowed to retain his
throne
Tigranes’ son; acts as advisor for
both Crassus and Antony
Pro-Parthian leanings lead to
their brief deposition under Augustus but
reinstated by Parthian king Phraataces
Rules during Tigranes’ absence
Installed by Augustus’ general
Gaius; rules in contest with Tigranes

Non-Artaxiad or Arsacid kings:
Artavasdes III (reign cont.) 1 BC-AD 12/13
Vonones

12/13?-13/14?

Orodes I
Artaxias III

14/15?-18
18-32

Arsaces I

32-35?

Mithridates

35?-52

Rhadamistus

52

Ariobarzanes’ son; Ruled
previously during Tigranes’ deposition;
reassumes throne after his father death
Son of Parthian king Phraates IV;
Becomes Armenian king after being
ousted from Parthian throne
Installed by Tiberius’ general
Germanicus; rules during period of
Romano-Parthian détente
Son of Parthian king Artabanus
III; his installation provokes yet another
round of Roman interference in Parthia’s
internal politics
Brother of Iberian king
Pharasmanes; assumes throne with
Rome’s consent
80

Tiridates I

53-60

Tigranes V

60-62

Brother of Parthian king
Vologases I; first installed as king during
Vologases’ invasion of Armenia
Appointed as king by Nero after
Corbulo’s successful campaign against
the Parthians; but eventually ousted
after Paetus’ defeat at Rhandeia

The Arsacid Dynasty:
Tiridates I (reign cont.)

62-75

Sanatruk
Axidares

75-110
110-113

Parthamasiris

113-114

Parthamaspates

116-117

Valarsh
Aurelius Pacorus
Valarsh II
Khusrau I
Tiridates II

117-140
161-163
180-91
191-217
217-52

Crowned by Nero at Rome; first
instance of Rome approving a Parthian
candidate for the Armenian throne
Nephew of Parthian king Osroes;
his installation served as Trajan’s
excuse to campaign against Parthia
Brother of Axidares; murdered by
Trajan
Son of Parthian king Osroes;
betrayed his father and allied with
Trajan to defeat Parthian rebels in
Mesopotamia

Captured by Caracalla

Note: Although outside the scope of this project, Arsacid kings continued to rule in
Armenia until the mid-fifth century. Their rule was finally abolished in AD 438 due to
pressure from the Iranian Sassanids.
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Parthian Kings
Arsaces
ca. 250-248
Tiridates I
ca. 248-211
Artabanus I
ca. 211-191
Priapatius
ca. 191-176
Phraates I
ca. 176-171
Mithridates I
ca. 171-138/37
Phraates II
138/37-ca. 128
Artabanus II
ca. 128-124/23
Mithridates II
ca. 123-88/87
Gotarzes I
91-81/80
Orodes I
80-76/75
Sinatruces
76/75-70 or 69
Phraates III
70 or 69-58/57
Mithridates III
58/57-55
Orodes II
ca. 57-37/36
Pacorus I
died in 38
Phraates IV
ca. 38-2
Tiridates II
ca. 30-25
Phraataces (Phraates V)
2 BC-AD 4

Orodes III
Vonones I
Artabanus III
Tiridates III
Gotarzes II
Vardanes
Vonones II
Vologases I
Vologases II
Pacorus II
Artabanus IV
Osroes
Parthamaspates
Vologases III
Mithridates IV
Vologases IV
Vologases V
Vologases VI
Artabanus V
Artavasdes

4-ca. 6/7
7/8-12
12-ca. 38
ca. 36
ca. 38-51
ca. 39-47/48
ca. 51
51/52-79/80
77-80
78-115/16
80-81
ca. 109/10-128/29
ca. 117
105/6-147
128/29-147
148-192
191-207/8
207/8-222/23
ca. 213-227
ca. 227-228/29

Roman Emperors
Augustus
27 BC-AD 14
Tiberius
14-37
Caligula
37-41
Claudius
41-54
Nero
54-68
Galba, Otho, Vitellius
68-69
Vespasian
69-79
Titus
79-81
Domitian
81-96
Nerva
96-98

Trajan
98-117
Hadrian
117-138
Antonius Pius
138-161
Marcus Aurelius
161-180
Lucius Verus
161-169
Commodus
180-192
Julianus and Pertinax
193
Septimius Severus 193-211
Caracalla
211-217
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Appendix 2: Maps
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